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When someone steals another’s clothes, we call them a thief. 
Should we not give the same name to one who could clothe the 
naked and does not? The bread in your cupboard belongs to the 
hungry; the coat unused in your closet belongs to the one who 
needs it; the shoes rotting in your closet belong to the one who 





The largest producer of nuts in the United States.
2
 A multi-billion dollar 
insurance and financial services company.
3
 The fourteenth largest radio 
chain in the country.
4
 “A catering company, a major television channel, an 
                                                                                                                 
 * Turcotte R.C. Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. 
 1. Basil the Great, quoted in Ask a Franciscan: Disposing of Excess Goods, 
FRANCISCAN MEDIA, https://www.franciscanmedia.org/ask-a-franciscan-disposing-of-excess-
goods/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018). 
 2. David Van Biema, Kingdom Come, TIME, Aug. 4, 1997, at 50. 
 3. See BENEFICIAL LIFE INS. CO., http://www.beneficialfinancialgroup.com (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2018). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church”) owns 
Beneficial Life Insurance Company, which had assets of approximately $3.3 billion in 2010, 
“according to the State of Utah Insurance Department.” The Mormon Global Business 
Empire, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2012, 1:25 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
photo-essays/2012-07-12/the-mormon-global-business-empire. Additionally, Ensign Peak 
Advisors is an investment fund of the church, with managers “specializ[ing] in international 
equities, cash management, fixed income, quantitative investment, and emerging markets.” 
Id. “One of Ensign Peak’s vice presidents” told a local Utah newspaper, in 2006, that 
“billions of dollars change hands every day.” Id. 
 4. See Biema, supra note 2. The church’s holding company, Deseret Management, 
owns numerous media properties, including “a TV station, 11 radio stations, a publishing 
and distribution company,” and a successful book publishing business (which routinely 
enters into financial contracts with the church’s leaders). The Mormon Global Business 
Empire, supra note 3. The size of this radio conglomerate is likely different now, as the 
church sold a number of its radio stations for $505 million in 2011 in order “to focus more 
on Internet ventures.” Caroline Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, BLOOMBERG (July 
18, 2012, 8:45 PM CDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-07-18/how-the-
mormons-make-money [hereinafter Winter, How the Mormons Make Money]. It is not 
possible to know whether this is accurate, however, as churches are not generally required to 
release financial information. See infra Part I for a discussion of charitable disclosures and 
the lack of mandatory church disclosure. Given this widespread lack of information, I will 
cite to what authority I can regarding the financial details of the various church entities 
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 Probably more land in both Utah and 
Florida than any other private actor.
13
 Internationally, there are major 
                                                                                                                 
discussed herein. However, by way of a standing admission, I freely acknowledge that many 
of these numbers are uncertain. 
 5. Brandon Young, Follow the Profit: A Guide to the LDS Church’s For-Profit 
Companies, LDS DAILY (May 4, 2016), http://www.ldsdaily.com/church-lds/follow-profit-
guide-lds-churchs-profit-companies.  
 6. See Duane Shimogawa, Mormon Church’s Company Buys Property, PAC. BUS. 
NEWS (Oct. 19, 2016, 12:23 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/pacific/news/2016/10/ 
19/mormon-churchs-company-buys-property.html (indicating ownership of tens of 
thousands of acres and other property worth tens of millions of dollars). On one of its tracts 
in Oahu, the LDS Church runs the “Polynesian Cultural Center . . . [which] features daily 
luaus, (except on Sunday), an ‘Island Buffet,’ seven simulated Polynesian villages, Samoan 
tree-climbing lessons, and Tahitian spear-throwing lessons.” The Mormon Global Business 
Empire, supra note 3. Tickets cost between $35 and $230. Id. In addition to these land 
interests and its amusement park, one of the LDS Church’s “for-profit arms, Hawaii 
Reserves, even runs a water management company, sewage treatment works, and two 
cemeteries,” as well. Id.  
 7. See Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of over 50,000 acres).  
 8. See Associated Press, LDS Church Buys 88,000 Acres in Nebraska, DESERET NEWS 
(Salt Lake City) (Oct. 7, 2004, 10:13 AM), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/595096557/ 
LDS-Church-buys-88000-acres-in-Nebraska.html.  
 9. See Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of 50,000 to 70,000 acres).  
 10. See Commercial Farms, MONEYINZION (June 18, 2014), http://www.moneyinzion. 
wordpress.com/2014/06/18/commerical-farms/ (indicating ownership of approximately 
120,000 acres).  
 11. See Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of approximately 85,000 acres).  
 12. See Commercial Farms, supra note 10 (indicating ownership of approximately 
68,000 acres). 
 13. See Statistics of the LDS by Temples of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, LDS CHURCH TEMPLES, https://ldschurchtemples.org/statistics/units/united-
states/utah/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2018) (indicating that there are 4791 wards and eighteen 
temples in Utah). A ward is a geographically limited congregation. Lee Davidson, In Utah, 
Mormon Chapels Are Here, There and Everywhere, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Sept. 30, 2014, 9:26 
AM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=58325676&itype=CMSID. While not every 
ward has a building, there are thousands of separate buildings within the state of Utah. See, 
e.g., id. (indicating that there are at least 1210 ward buildings in the three largest counties in 
Utah). This is in addition to the campus of Brigham Young University, a large missionary 
training center, numerous storehouses, and an unknowable number of other buildings 
(including a $2 billion megamall developed by the LDS Church and completed in March 
2012, which features a retractable glass roof and includes almost 100 stores and restaurants, 
office towers, and hundreds of luxury apartments and condominiums). See, e.g., Young, 
supra note 5; The Mormon Global Business Empire, supra note 3; Tony Semerad, City 
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investments in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, and Mexico,
14
 and 
about as much land in Britain as the Crown Estate.
15
  
Take these assets, add billions in stocks and bonds and other securities, 
and include another $6-$8 billion per year of donated funds.
16
 To most of 
us, such a collection of assets and income probably seems appropriate for a 
large, public corporation.  
However, as the preceding footnotes make clear, the entity described is 
not a titan of industry but is instead a church. And that is the starting point 
for this Article: though the American legal system is deferential toward 
                                                                                                                 
Creek Center: A Mall Built to Last and to Lead, but Will It?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (May 11, 
2015, 12:50 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=2488265&itype=CMSID; Caroline 
Winter et al., The Money Behind the Mormon Message, THE SALT LAKE TRIB. (Oct. 5, 2012, 
12:18 PM), http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=54478720&itype=CMSID [hereinafter 
Winter et al., Money Behind the Mormon Message]; Young, supra note 5. Targeting Florida, 
the LDS Church purchased about 295,000 acres of land in Brevard, Orange, and Osceola 
counties in 1950 and kept on buying. Amy Martinez, The Mormon Church – Land Lord, 
FLA. TREND (Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.floridatrend.com/article/17957/the-mormon-
church--land-lord. In March 2014, it purchased another 383,000 acres for $562,000,000. Id. 
On its 290,000 acre Deseret Ranch, the LDS Church “keeps 44,000 cows and 1,300 bulls”; it 
maintains “1,700 acres of citrus trees”; and it operates “timber, sod, and fossilized-seashell 
businesses.” The Mormon Global Business Empire, supra note 3.  
 14. See Claire Provost, From Book to Boom: How the Mormons Plan a City for 500,000 
in Florida, GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2017, 2:59 EST), https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/ 
jan/30/from-book-to-boom-how-the-mormons-plan-a-city-for-500000-in-florida; Winter, 
How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4; Young, supra note 5 (indicating ownership of 
approximately 100,000 acres in Alberta). 
 15. See Catherine Pepinster, Mormons Pay £30m for Prime British Farmland, 
INDEPENDENT (July 15, 2001), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/mormons-
pay-30m-for-prime-british-farmland-9215914.html.  
 16. Peter Henderson, Insight: Mormon Church Made Wealthy by Donations, REUTERS: 
SPECIAL REPORTS (Aug. 12, 2012, 6:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
politics-mormons/insight-mormon-church-made-wealthy-by-donations-idUSBRE87B05W0 
812; Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4. This is in addition to the income 
from the aforementioned assets. For the basis of these estimates, see Provost, supra note 14 
(discussing numbers provided by Ryan Cragun, associate professor of sociology at the 
University of Tampa, who estimated real estate assets in excess of $35,000,000,000 and 
tithing income of as much as $7,000,000,000 per year). Similarly, in 1997, Time estimated 
the total value at $30 billion and annual tithing at $5 billion. See Winter, How the Mormons 
Make Money, supra note 4. More recently, Reuters and Professor Cragun estimated a net 
worth of $40 billion and tithing of $8 billion. See id. (quoting Keith McMullin—the Chief 
Executive Officer of Deseret Management Corporation (“DMC”), one of the LDS Church’s 
affiliated entities—as indicating that DMC had annual revenue of approximately $1.2 
billion, though noting that McMullin later retracted that claim through an LDS spokesman, 
without clarification).  
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religion and churches, it is undeniable that the Church of Latter-day 
Saints—and other like organizations—are not just churches. They are, 
instead, important participants in the market economy, some of them global 
business enterprises of major proportions.
17
 This twinning of profit and 
spirit is seamless for many religions, with numerous modern churches 
preaching a “prosperity gospel” that promises spiritual and temporal 
blessings in return for donations.
18
 Still other churches—such as the Church 
of Scientology—directly charge for religious services that are “necessary” 
for spiritual improvement and advancement in the church hierarchy.
19
 And 
still others accumulate their own reserves of property and wealth.
20
 This 
                                                                                                                 
 17. The number of entities and subsidiary organizations owned or controlled by the 
LDS Church is not publicly available information; the organization owns its property and 
businesses through an undisclosed network of subsidiaries, trusts, and foreign entities. See 
Provost, supra note 14. It is difficult to determine which of these are “for-profit” and which 
are “non-profit” and to know if the label even matters, given that some of the nonprofit 
entities appear to generate significant profits. See Winter et al., Money Behind the Mormon 
Message, supra note 13 (discussing the Polynesian Cultural Center, which had to begin 
“paying commercial property taxes in 1992 when the Land and Tax Appeal Court of Hawaii 
ruled that the” center was not actually charitable in nature). Whatever the ultimate number of 
entities or sub-entities—and whether they are designated as profit or non-profit and however 
they are owned or tied to the set of entities that constitute the LDS Church—this Article will 
refer to the integrated body of church entities as a whole. This whole is overseen by an 
individual called a “Prophet” who is the most senior “Apostle,” designated by his length of 
service. See Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4. There are twelve 
Apostles, in addition to the prophet, and this group collectively oversees a professional class 
of church leaders consisting of hundreds of “General Authorities” employed to run the 
religious and non-religious activities of the church, often through the hiring and supervision 
of business managers, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals. See id. In total, the 
organization employs thousands (or perhaps tens of thousands) of employees. See id. 
(quoting the CEO of DMC indicating that just that one entity has “2,000 to 3,000 
employees”).  
 18. See Lidiya Mishchenko, In Defense of Churches: Can the IRS Limit Tax Abuse by 
“Church” Impostors?, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2016) (“Under the prosperity 
gospel, church membership may actually be conditioned on provision of regular donations, 
or ‘tithes,’ and if a congregant is struggling in their life, they may be told that God is 
punishing them and they need to donate even more money to the church.”).  
 19. Id. The last reported income of the Church of Scientology was approximately $300 
million per year, and the average megachurch in 2008 generated annual income of over $6.5 
million. Id. at 364.  
 20. See, e.g., Earthly Concerns, ECONOMIST (Aug. 18, 2012), http://www.economist. 
com/node/21560536 (indicating that Timothy Dolan, owner of a corporation sole in his 
position of Cardinal-Archbishop of New York, is believed to be the largest landowner in 
Manhattan). 
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asset assemblage leads, ineluctably, to enormous income and wealth 
concentrated in the hands of religious organizations across America. 
While there is nothing inherently wrong with religious organizations 
amassing wealth, it is troubling that they do so while enjoying 
informational and tax advantages not afforded to other entities. However, 
these benefits are not “tax advantages”; these are “tax advantages that are 
expressly made unavailable to other, competing, profit-seeking entities that 
suffer greatly due to their comparative disadvantage.” Indeed, this Article’s 
foundational claim is these advantages are so significant that they have 
come to shape the aims and actions of many religions, effectively bending 
the nature of many organizations away from traditionally religious and 
charitable work and toward profit-seeking.
21
 This state is both unintended 
and inequitable. As such, these advantages should be eliminated.  
Before describing any recommended changes to these tax benefits, it is 
critical to first understand how the American tax system treats churches. As 
explained in Part I, our legal and tax system is laced with a series of 
benefits and exemptions that favor churches over virtually every other kind 
of entity. These benefits permit churches to bring in funds under the 
auspices of a non-profit entity and then direct those funds to for-profit 
endeavors.
22
 Indeed, not only are churches permitted to do this, they are 
                                                                                                                 
 21. This is a systemic issue potentially affecting all churches, and I provide numerous 
examples throughout this Article. The LDS Church is referenced a number of times not 
because it is unique but because it appears to be a particularly apt example of the broader 
issues discussed herein. 
 22. In particular, there is nothing preventing a church from taking its “tithes” and 
“investing” them in for-profit businesses (wholly owned or otherwise). The effects and 
associated advantages of having both for-profit and non-profit channels of revenue are 
discussed at length. See infra Section II.B. To be fair, churches will likely counter that such 
an argument is misplaced, claiming that there is no mixing of profit and non-profit funds. 
See Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4 (quoting McMullin that “not one 
penny of tithing” flows through to the LDS church’s for-profit entities or endeavors). 
Though this kind of response has some visceral appeal, it can be rather easily disposed of 
because of the fungible nature of money. A centrally run entity can attempt to silo profit and 
non-profit activities, but all activities (whatever their nature) ultimately accrue to the benefit 
of the whole when that whole is owned by the same entity. Indeed, it is simply not 
functionally possible to separate funds in this manner, especially in the context of a related 
series of associations that ultimately belong to a single, centrally managed entity. In such a 
situation, the ultimate level of ownership controls every entity, all of which are legally and 
technically permitted to transfer funds from one entity to another. A business can segregate 
its subsidiaries and sources of income, on paper, for a variety of business or legal reasons, 
but the benefits flowing to any one part (i.e., via tax-free funding or an exemption from 
property tax or from any other source) necessarily helps every other related part by freeing 
resources and ensuring financial flexibility and strength throughout the entire entity. In other 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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incentivized to do so. Because these organizations are uniquely permitted to 
build up networks of interlocking entities of non-profit and for-profit 
subsidiaries and freely funnel funds from one to the other, churches are 
effectively permitted to own profit-seeking entities that have an intrinsically 
lower cost of capital than their competitors. This system ensures that 
church-affiliated companies will always enjoy a superior market position.
23
 
In the face of such economic opportunity, how could any entity not do what 
these churches have done? It is difficult to blame churches for taking 
advantage of a U.S. system of religious tax exemption that effectively 
guarantees them preferential returns on church-sourced funds when those 
funds are directed to profit-seeking instead of charity.
24
 
Blameworthy or not, this tax structure is problematic. Such a market-
oriented incentive discourages churches from expending funds in pursuit of 
charitable goals. The American economy is a capitalistic one, rewarding 
capital, among other things. Permitting churches, with their lower cost of 
capital, to access markets that reward capital means that every dollar 
devoted to the needy is not being devoted to its highest and best use—from 
an internal rate-of-return perspective. That, of course, will lead to “under-
                                                                                                                 
words, because money is fungible and decision-making is integrated, the entities 
unavoidably act as an effectively incorporated unit, supporting each other and affecting the 
market economy in a perceivably unitary fashion. An excellent, if eccentric, example is the 
way that the LDS Church asks its members to serve unpaid missions and then assigns them 
to work at revenue-generating enterprises. See Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, 
supra note 4. It is clear, in such a situation, that people are donating to an entity that is using 
those ostensibly charitable donations to generate revenue and/or profit for other related 
entities. To claim, in such a situation, that religious tithes or offerings are not going toward 
revenue generation or profit-seeking is untenable. Some church officials have expressly 
acknowledged the economic truth of this in less guarded moments. See, e.g., id. (quoting 
McMullin as indicating that funds do, from time to time, flow throughout the LDS Church’s 
family of entities to help stanch losses in one or another part of the organization).  
 23. Or perhaps that they will be able to dominate markets with extremely low profit 
margins (such as is increasingly the case with traditional print media).  
 24. It is worth emphasizing a few important disclaimers at this point. First, I do not 
claim that all churches skew away from charity and toward profit-seeking. There are many 
churches that do not, likely for a whole host of cultural, social, geographic, and other reasons 
that are outside the scope of this Article. Second, even as to those churches that have clearly 
invested more resources in profit-seeking than in traditionally charitable activity, the 
arguments and conclusions contained herein do not necessarily indicate that these entities are 
behaving “badly.” In fact, by explicating non-charitable activity in terms of the incentives 
embodied in the Internal Revenue Code (the “IRC”), I am stripping such behavior of moral 
weight. I am not arguing that any given church is immoral—I am arguing that many 
churches are amoral, rationally pursuing the economic advantages built into our tax system 
without regard to any underlying spiritual or moral code. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/4
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spending” on charity, which is deleterious to the public policy underlying 
the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code.  
The United States was clear in its reasoning when it made the decision 
that churches should enjoy special tax status: the government explicitly 
decided to forego the substantial tax revenues associated with funds raised 
and expended by churches because it believed that these entities—of all 
entities—would use those funds to do the “good works” that would 
otherwise be the responsibility of government.
25
 Taxing a church on funds 
that it could use to set up an orphanage makes no sense, for example, if 
such taxation would force the church to abandon its plans for the orphanage 
and leave the government to ultimately clean up the remains itself. Indeed, 
the U.S. government—through Congress, the judiciary, and the IRS—has 
been extraordinarily generous in its treatment of churches in connection 
with tax law, both in terms of how it has interpreted and applied tax laws 
and rules to churches and in terms of how much tax money the government 
has foregone. But that attempt to generate private party charity is defeated, 
at great expense to the American taxpayer, when churches invest instead of 
help. 
Even more troubling than the undercutting of U.S. tax policy is when 
churches use their tax-exempt funds to engage in massive business 
operations instead of directing funds toward charity. This does actual 
damage to the broader market economy. As discussed in Part II below, 
when non-taxed organizations compete against ordinary business entities in 
the market, they operate under different economic constraints and disrupt 
the normal functioning of capital supply and demand, fundamentally 
distorting the market place. By tapping into untaxed capital, these non-
taxed businesses put downward pressure on the rates of return that would 
otherwise be available in an equally constructed market place, which 
burdens other economic actors. Accordingly, it is not simply that charitable 
entities undermine the intent of the IRC when they engage in profit-seeking 
activities—it is that by doing so, they distort the economy and introduce 
inherent market inefficiencies. 
Part III makes recommendations intended to resolve this problem as it 
manifests itself in the context of churches. These suggestions largely 
revolve around increased transparency and the potential imposition of a tax 
on funds that are not spent on charitable endeavors. Laying bare the 
finances of these organizations will enable all stakeholders in charitable 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See infra Section I.A. for a more nuanced discussion of the policy behind providing 
so many tax subsidies and advantages to churches. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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giving—including, importantly, U.S. taxpayers—to see how their 
investments are being spent. Furthermore, taxing non-charitable funds 
would ensure that our tax system functions the way it is intended—without 
favor or distortion. 
I. Widows & Orphans 
The United States government has decided that certain entities should 
enjoy favorable tax status.
26
 This encompasses a variety of entities, 
including churches and religious organizations.
27
 The economic calculus 
behind this political decision is intuitive: if an organization is going to 
dedicate itself and its funds to fulfilling public needs that would otherwise 
have to be served by the government itself, then the government should not 
tax the resources that are going to fill those needs.
28
 Often, however, 
charitable activity is not what is happening. The policy of tax exemption for 
churches costs the U.S. taxpayer billions and billions of dollars every year 
and is accomplishing significantly less than intended because it is, in fact, 
being subverted by groups that direct those tax-free funds to for-profit 
enterprises instead of charitable ends.
29
 
A. The Big Idea and the Law 
Tax exemption for favored entities is not a novel idea. It predates the 
formation of the republic itself; early settlers formed all sorts of “charitable 
and other ‘voluntary’ associations.”30 That fervor continues to this day, 
                                                                                                                 
 26. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (2012); Mishchenko, supra note 18. 
 27. See Mishchenko, supra note 18. 
 28. See id. at 1371. 
 29. See id. at 1364 (“All of America is subsidizing these jets and mansions.”).  
 30. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, 
SOI BULLETIN (IRS), Winter 2008, at 105, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf. 
Alexis de Tocqueville had a penchant for this, noting in 1831 that 
Americans of all ages, all conditions, and all dispositions, constantly form 
associations. They have not, only commercial and manufacturing companies, in 
which all take part, but associations of a thousand other kinds, --  religious, 
moral, serious, futile . . . I have often admired the extreme skill with which the 
inhabitants of the United States succeed in proposing a common object to the 
exertions of a great many men, and in inducing them voluntarily to pursue it. 
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 130-31 (Henry Reeve Trans., Sever & 
Francis 1863); see also Donald L. Sharpe, Unfair Business Competition and the Tax on 
Income Destined for Charity: Forty-Six Years Later, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 367, 369 (1996) 
(“From the very beginning, tax law in the United States has recognized the unique role 
played by private, nonprofit charitable organizations by affording them exemption from 
tax.”). 
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reflected throughout our country’s various iterations of income tax rules 
and regulations, all of which contain provisions favorable to “non-profits” 
or “charities.”31 The focus of this Article is the suite of benefits conferred 
upon churches, but it is helpful to start with the broader concept of taxation 
of charities and non-profits.
32
  
The structure of tax exemption granted to charities and voluntary 
organizations revolves around numerous different provisions of the IRC 
and has evolved through legislation enacted between 1894 and 1969 and 
various judicial decisions interpreting that legislation.
33
 Over that period, 
the government built the basic outlines of charitable taxation, identified tax-
exempt entities, set forth certain activities of exempt organizations that 




Though much has changed over time, the basic contours of tax 
exemption have stayed the same and are today largely encompassed within 
I.R.C. § 501, particularly subsection (c)(3), which governs charities.
35
 
Broadly speaking, any organization that falls within this subsection will not 
have to pay income tax and can also receive tax-deductible donations.
36
 
                                                                                                                 
 31. See infra Section I.B.  
 32. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (exempting religious, educational, charitable, 
scientific, or literary organizations; organizations that test for public safety; organizations 
that prevent cruelty to children or animals; and organizations that foster national or 
international amateur sports competition).  
 33. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 106. See generally Harvey P. Dale & Roger 
Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX LAW. 331 
(2015) (reviewing in detail the “main federal income tax rules affecting charitable 
contributions”).  
 34. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 106–09 (tracing the evolution of the relevant 
federal income tax law from the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 to the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006).  
 35. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Private foundations are also included within § 501(c)(3). 
Many other kinds of entities are exempted from taxation under other subsections of § 501. 
See, e.g., id. §§ 501(a), (c) (listing many different kinds of exempt organizations, including, 
for example, corporations organized by an Act of Congress, social welfare organizations, 
domestic fraternal beneficiary societies, and supplemental unemployment benefit trusts); see 
also David S. Miller, Reforming the Taxation of Exempt Organizations and Their Patrons, 
67 TAX LAW. 451, 454 (2014) (“[T]here are more than 29 different types of tax-exempt 
entities in section 501(c) alone and by some counts more than 70 in all.”). The arguments set 
forth in this Article are uniquely addressed to charities, which are governed by § 501(c)(3), 
and churches particularly, for reasons discussed below.  
 36. Such entities are also theoretically prohibited from using their tax-exempted income 
to benefit individuals associated with the organization. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, 
at 106. Two additional, important nuances were introduced into this statutory regime in 1950 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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These are the two primary tax benefits of qualifying under § 501(c)(3) and 
are, of course, valuable. Being exempt from income tax is easily 
appreciated and of enormous importance, but the other benefit is also 
significant.
37
 The policy behind permitting tax-deductible donations is to 
subsidize (and thereby stimulate) charitable giving, but the wider 
implications of being able to raise funds tax-free are rarely considered or 
understood, as this Article argues.
38
 
For the moment, it suffices to point out these advantages specifically in 
the context of churches. They often pay little or no property tax, they 
receive sales tax exemptions, they benefit from a related business income 
tax subsidy, and their employees’ compensation is often exempted from tax 
under the parsonage exemption.
39
 
                                                                                                                 
and 1969, respectively. “Before the 1950s, tax-exempt organizations could earn tax-free 
income from both mission-related activities and commercial business activities that were 
unrelated to the purpose for which they were exempt . . . .” Id. at 107. Motivated by a 
concern that this afforded these entities an “unfair competitive advantage over taxable 
entities,” however, “Congress established the ‘unrelated business income tax’ (UBIT))” in 
1950, which imposed a tax on unrelated business income (i.e., income that is not 
“‘substantially related’ to the organization’s exempt purpose”). Arnsberger et al., supra note 
30, at 107; see also Jennifer Anne Spiegel, Sierra Club: Rationalizing the Royalty Exception 
to the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1697, 1720–33 (1995) (noting 
the original basis for UBIT legislation as a desire to prevent unfair competition, though also 
noting the evolving nature of how courts and scholars view and apply the relevant law). 
Then, in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress introduced legislation intended to bring 
“private foundations” to heel. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107; The Role of 
Foundations Today and the Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 upon Foundations: 
Hearing Before the Comm. On Fin., Testimony Presented to the Subcommittee on 
Foundations, 93d Cong. (Comm. Print 1978). Private foundations are “defined in the 
negative, as a charity that cannot qualify as a public charity.” Roger Colinvaux, Charity in 
the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA. TAX. REV. 1, 54 (2011). Broadly 
speaking, the idea is that charities that are overseen by a donor or service-based community 
that is public in nature will be effectively policed thereby. See id. “By the 1960s, there was a 
growing perception among lawmakers that private foundations, [in contrast to public 
charities,] with their small networks of financers and administrators were less accountable to 
the public than traditional charities.” Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107. As such, 
Congress introduced rules taxing certain investment income and requiring minimum 
distributions. Id. at 108. Though the specifics of UBIT and of private foundation governance 
and taxation are outside the scope of this Article, these concepts, as broadly interpreted, bear 
upon the thesis discussed herein. See infra Section II.B, Part III.  
 37. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1), 501 (2012). The untaxed source of capital is made possible 
because donations to charities are deductible by the donor. 
 38. See infra Part II.  
 39. See Miller, supra note 35, at 492 (describing “the full array of tax subsidies: (1) a 
charitable deduction for donors, (2) donor deductions for gifts of long-term capital gain 
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Why does America voluntarily forego tens of billions of dollars every 
year in tax revenue, and why has it historically been so open and solicitous 
of these kinds of organizations?
40
 This kind of examination is easiest to 
undertake in the context of churches because these charities have one of the 
longest histories of special treatment, and because they appear to have 
enjoyed tax benefits in almost every culture and every time period.
41
  
                                                                                                                 
property, (3) absence of tax on donor’s built-in gain appreciated capital assets . . . , (4) 
absence of tax on the organization on donations, (5) absence of gift tax on the donor, and (6) 
freedom from tax on the organization’s non-UBTI [unrelated business taxable income] 
income”); see also Unrelated Business Income Tax: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On 
Oversight of the House Comm. On Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 98–99 (1987) (statement 
of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, 
complaining that nonprofits enjoy numerous competitive advantages, including tax 
exemptions; subsidized mail rates; special treatment under social security, unemployment 
insurance, and minimum wage laws). But see MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A DESTRO, 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 767–89 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing tax subsidy 
and tax expenditure metrics as applied to religious organizations). This Article focuses on 
churches (and the integrated auxiliaries that are lumped with them for tax purposes); finer 
distinctions between different kinds of religious organizations do not ultimately affect the 
underlying problems or proposed solutions discussed here. Not all of these advantages are 
federal in nature. For instance, each state is responsible for classifying religious entities and 
for deciding which of those categories qualify for property tax exemptions or discounts. 
Whatever the nature of that framework, however, the real and personal property owned by a 
“church” is often exempted from state and local property taxes. See generally Michael K. 
Ryan, Note, A Requiem for Religiously Based Property, 89 GEO. L.J. 2139 (2001). See also, 
e.g., Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 278 F. Supp. 3d 1081, 1104 (W.D. Wis. 2017) (holding the 
parsonage exception violates of the establishment clause of the First Amendment); City of 
Austin v. Univ. Christian Church, 768 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Tex. 1988) (deciding whether a 
parking lot attached to the church is exempt). 
 40. See Ryan T. Cragun et al., Research Report: How Secular Humanists (and Everyone 
Else) Subsidize Religion in the United States, FREE INQUIRY, June/July 2012, at 39, 39, 
http://users.clas.ufl.edu/kenwald/rpp/cragun.pdf (estimating an annual tax subsidy to 
churches of over $70 billion per year). This estimate is rough and likely overstates the value 
of tax deductions tied to church tithes, given that most tithe payers likely claim the standard 
deduction (instead of an itemized deduction) and given that many transfers to churches 
would likely qualify as untaxable gifts. See 4 RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 
31:12, Westlaw (“Regardless of the religious imperative to pay a tithe, its contribution is 
typically tax deductible to the donor because there is no legal obligation to make a payment 
of tithing. As a gift, it is not included in the income of the recipient religious organization.”). 
That said, there is simply no way to track this information, and it is highly likely that 
churches in fact receive billions of dollars of value via the charitable deduction and billions 
of dollars of value via other tax advantages. 
 41. See John W. Whitehead, Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional 
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 522–45 (1991). Indeed, some scholars believe that “tax 
exemption of church property is probably as ancient as taxation itself.” LEO PFEFFER, 
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Analyzing the long-term pattern of the taxation of churches throughout 
history, governments have exempted charities because they generally 
believed that these organizations devoted their property to helping the 
public, broadly defined as activities that provide physical support to those 
in need.
42
 That is, “[t]he traditional explanation for why public charities 
have been removed from the tax rolls is that ‘they relieve the government 
from the burden of performing certain services or providing certain goods 
to the public.’”43 Churches and other charities devote their resources to 
                                                                                                                 
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 210 (rev. ed. 1967); see also Claude W. Stimson, The 
Exemption of Property from Taxation in the United States, 18 MINN. L. REV. 411, 416 
(1934). “It has always been the case, clear back to the priests of Egypt and beyond them into 
the coulisses of prehistory. The priests and Levites were exempt from taxation . . . , but . . . 
[it] is merely . . . a long-existing custom.” DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT 
PAY TAXES 5 (1977); Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 973-74 (1999); Whitehead, supra, at 524–28. Foreshadowing the 
animating thesis of this Article, this exemption has long been economically significant in the 
context of organized religion: 
[T]he priests . . . turned [contributed wealth] into productive or investment 
capital, and became the greatest agriculturists, manufacturers and financiers of 
the nation. Not only did they hold vast tracts of land; they owned a great 
number of slaves, or controlled hundreds of laborers, who were hired out to 
other employers, or worked for the temples in their divers trades from the 
playing of music to the brewing of beer. The priests were also the greatest 
merchants and financiers of Babylonia; they sold the varied products of the 
temple shops, and handled a large proportion of the country's trade; they had a 
reputation for wise investment, and many persons entrusted their savings to 
them, confident of a modest but reliable return. They made loans on more 
lenient terms than the private money-lenders . . . . 
1 WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 233 (1954).  
 42. This is stereotypically thought of as helping orphans, the indigent, and the elderly. 
See, e.g., Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz.,. 1, c. 4 (Eng.), repealed by Mortmain and 
Charitable Uses Act 1888, 51 & 52 Vict., c. 42 (Eng.); see John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of 
Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 
363, 377 (1991). The record indicates that the Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601 centered on 
public benefit, specifically with curing poverty in mind. See John P. Persons et al., Criteria 
for Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3), in 4 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE 
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS 1909, 1913 (Dep’t of Treasury 
ed., 1977). But see Comm’rs for Special Purposes of the Income Tax v. Pemsel, [1891] AC 
531 (HL) 559 (holding that “charitable” and “pious” were synonymous with “godly” in 
English law). This is also known as the “public benefit” theory. See ARIENS & DESTRO, 
supra note 39, at 739. And “[t]he requirement that a charitable use be dedicated to the 
benefit of the public is well established in both English and American law.” Id. at 751 (citing 
Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472 (1990)). 
 43. Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an Intermediate Penalty to 
Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125, 129 (2011) (quoting Robert 
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public needs, “eas[ing] a burden on government” so the government should 
not pressure, or tax, those resources.
44
 Given the substantial history 
involved and the broad scope of this issue (taxation as applied to charitable 
constructs), there are many different factors—besides amelioration of 
governmental burden—that have contributed to this targeted exemption and 
subsidy.
45
 Particularly as it relates to churches, many proponents have 








morality, and otherwise providing the cornerstone of a “civil society . . . 
                                                                                                                 
Paine, The Tax Treatment of International Philanthropy and Public Policy, 19 AKRON TAX J. 
1, 12 (2004)); see also Miller, supra note 35, at 457 (“One leading rationale for the tax 
exemption for 501(c)(3)s is that the money earned and spent by exempt organizations 
provides a public service that saves the federal government funds it would otherwise 
spend.”) (citing STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., JCX-29-0605, 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRESENT LAW OF THE FEDERAL FOR CHARITIES AND OTHER 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 28 (Comm. Print 2005); Sharpe, supra note 30, at 376 (“[T]he 
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which 
would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits 
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 
(1938)). But see Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable 
Tax Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1381 (1991) (“Due primarily to the vast array of 
activities to which the exemption has been applied, it has defied all past attempts to 
formulate a synthesizing concept of charitable.”). 
 44. Robert Paine, The Tax Treatment of International Philanthropy and Public Policy, 
19 AKRON TAX J. 1, 12 (2004); see also, e.g., Chauncey Belknap, The Federal Income Tax 
Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy, in 4 RESEARCH 
PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, 
supra note 42, at 2025, 2033-34; BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 8–18 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 7th ed. 1998)). 
 45. In particular, the non-taxation of religious entities and organizations is multi-
faceted. See, e.g., DURANT, supra note 41; King, supra note 41, at 973–76; ROUNDELL 
PALMER, EARL OF SELBORNE, ANCIENT FACTS AND FICTION: CONCERNING CHURCHES AND 
TITHES 194 (London, MacMillian & Co. 1892) (discussing the nuanced difference between 
decimation and special tithes); Whitehead, supra note 41, at 529–30; Geo Widengren, The 
Status of the Jews in the Sasasian Empire, 1 IRANICA ANTIQUA 117, 149–53 (1961).  
 46. Trs. of the First Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Atlanta, 76 Ga. 181, 192–93 
(1886), rev’d on other grounds, City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 13 S.E. 252 
(Ga. 1891). 
 47. See PHILIP SCHAFF, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 75 (1888); Henry W. 
Foote, The Taxation of Churches, in 7 UNITARIAN REVIEW AND RELIGIOUS MAGAZINE 349, 
469-71 (Boston, 1877) (bound volume of magazine issues). 
 48. See, e.g., Warde v. City of Manchester, 56 N.H. 508 (1876).  
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that could not endure” without such ideals.49 Similarly, there has also been 
much give-and-take regarding the exemption itself, as charities have 
struggled with state entities over time, always seeking lower tax burdens 
with varying levels of success.
50
  
                                                                                                                 
 49. First Methodist Episcopal Church, 76 Ga. at 192–93, rev’d on other grounds, First 
Presbyterian Church, 13 S.E. 252; see also A.T. Bledsoe, Taxation of Church Property, 
SOUTHERN REV., July 1876, at 169, 174 (“It is upon this principle . . . that church property 
has heretofore been exempted from taxation, viz. that the exemption was worth more to the 
State than the taxation. Churches are not built for purposes of gain . . . . [T]he church is built 
for the benefit of the public . . . .”); SCHAFF, supra note 47, at 19–20; Foote, supra note 47, at 
469-71. Justice Brennan nicely encapsulated both of these arguments in Walz v. Tax 
Commission of New York, when he wrote, about churches:  
First, these organizations are exempted because they, among a range of other 
private, nonprofit organizations contribute to the well-being of the community 
in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that would 
otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the 
detriment of the community.  
 . . . . 
 Second, government grants exemptions to religious organizations because 
they uniquely contribute to the pluralism of American society by their religious 
activities. Government may properly include religious institutions among the 
variety of private, nonprofit groups that receive tax exemptions, for each group 
contributes to the diversity of association, viewpoint, and enterprise essential to 
a vigorous, pluralistic society.  
397 U.S. 664, 687–89 (1970) (citing Wash. Ethical Soc’y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d 
127, 129 (1957); New York Constitutional Convention: Report of the Committee on 
Taxation doc. no. 2, at 2 (1938)). And, to be fair, this broad-based view of the utility of 
religion is reflected within the relevant statutes and regulations. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) includes 
“religious purposes” among its exempt endeavors, and Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iv) 
defines “charitable” as including, among other things, “advancement of religion.” Arguably, 
then, anything a church does is contemplated by the relevant tax provisions; any business or 
investment activity that redounds to a church’s benefit could be described as advancing the 
relevant religion or church. But that seems disingenuous and wholly at odds with the 
publicly accepted purpose of providing tax subsidies to churches, which purpose (as 
expounded by churches themselves) ties directly to the concept of direct charity. Part III, 
infra, expounds upon this discrepancy, arguing that churches are uniquely susceptible to a 
kind of mission creep that ultimately pushes their activities outside anything close to the core 
charitable purposes that most people associate with organized religion. 
 50. A variety of Christian kings, for instance, imposed heavy taxes on the Catholic 
Church over the years. See J.J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII, at 241–304 (1970) (on the 
Henrician Reformation); see also id. at 536–42 (bibliography referencing secondary sources 
on the economic aspect of this reformation). Similarly, to finance their secular war in 1294, 
Philip IV and Edward I imposed a tax on the “property and personnel of the Church.” 4 
WILL DURANT, THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: THE AGE OF FAITH 812–13 (1950). Similarly, in 
England, Henry VIII—knowing that the Church had approximately three times the land and 
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Whatever the history and vagaries of secular-religious conflict, a 
defensible consensus emerges that the United States affords tax subsidies to 
churches and other charities because these entities provide charitable 
services that “would otherwise be imposed upon the public . . . by general 
taxation.”51 This is why the American taxpayer makes such a substantial, 
explicit investment in charity through its untold billions of dollars in tax 
                                                                                                                 
wealth as the Crown—renounced taxation and confiscated the majority of the Church’s 
property. ALFRED BALK, THE FREE LIST: PROPERTY WITHOUT TAXES 21 (Russell Sage 
Found. 1971).  
 51. YMCA v. Douglas Cty., 83 N.W. 924, 926 (1900); see also Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983) (“Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought 
beneficial to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular community, are 
deeply rooted in our history, as in that of England.”); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 
578, 581 (1924) (“Evidently the [charitable] exemption is made in recognition of the benefit 
which the public derives from corporate activities of the class named, and is intended to aid 
them when not conducted for private gain.”); Murray v. Comptroller of Treasury, 216 A.2d 
897, 907-09 (Md. 1966) (citing a list of tax exemption arguments), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 
816 (1966); see also H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938) (Revenue Act of 1938) 
(“[E]xemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes 
is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its 
relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from 
public funds.”); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the Charitable Tax Subsidies, 
56 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1351-52 (2015) (“According to this ‘economic subsidy theory,’ 
subsidizing charities helps them to provide public goods that would otherwise be under-
produced.”); id. at 1349-51 (noting that §§ 170(c) and 501(c)(3) are “widely considered to be 
subsidies for favored social policies,” a concept known as “tax expenditure analysis”); Reka 
Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes: 
Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71 (1991); John Montague, The Law and 
Financial Transparency in Churches: Reconsidering the Form 990 Exemption, 35 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 203, 259 (2013) (“[B]ecause churches are subsidized by taxpayer money, the 
public . . . has a right to know what happens to it.”). That said, there is no explicit 
requirement that “a church or predominantly religious organization must relieve a burden of 
government in order to qualify as a charitable institution . . . since . . . government is not in 
the business of religion.” Christian Reformed Church v. City of Grand Rapids, 303 N.W.2d 
913, 918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981). And, as discussed above, there are other arguments 
regarding the exemption of churches—but a reason does not have to be exclusive to be 
significant. See Spiegel, supra note 36, at 1697 (“Tax exemption is a subsidy that society 
confers on certain nonprofit organizations.”); see also, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316, 347 (1819) (“A right to tax, is a right to destroy.”); ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 38, at 
720 (reviewing the constitutional ability of the State to tax churches); EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, 
TAXING THE CHURCH 113-56 (2017) (chapter 5, “Untangling Entanglement”) (arguing that 
taxation of churches risks undue entanglement sufficient to justify church exemption in a 
variety of settings). 
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subsidies, and this is the reasoning behind the structure that emerges in the 
IRC.
52
 Unfortunately, that structure permits misuse and opacity.  
B. A System Built for Abuse 
When it comes to churches, there is a critical lack of transparency and 
clarity built into the IRC, the regulations, and court decisions surrounding 
and implanting it. This results in a system that is effectively built for 
systemic abuse. 
To begin, there is no comprehensive legal definition of “church.”53 This 
permits a variety of organizations to benefit from exempt status while 
engaging in a wide array of activities divorced from anything like the 
charitable activities that supposedly justify the tax subsidies afforded to 
churches. The Supreme Court has spoken on this issue several times in 
different contexts, but it has never articulated a concrete, usable formula.
54
 
Instead, the Court has developed an evolved view of belief, starting with a 
focus on “the Creator” and eventually settling on “deeply and sincerely 
[held] beliefs.”55 Ineluctably, this broad-based view of religion means that 
                                                                                                                 
 52. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (2017) (listing as charitable ends “[r]elief of 
the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of religion; advancement of 
education or science; erection or maintenance of public buildings, monuments, or works; 
lessening of the burdens of Government”). 
 53. See, e.g., Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate – Never the 
Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX REV. 35, 76 (2004). 
 54. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 
490 U.S. 680 (1989); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493 U.S. 
378 (1990). 
 55. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970). The Court’s first attempt can be 
seen in Reynolds v. United States, where the majority candidly admitted that “the word 
‘religion’ is not defined in the Constitution.” 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878). Twelve years later, in 
Davis v. Beason, the Court asserted a theistic notion of religion as being inseparable from a 
Creator. 133 U.S. 333 (1890), abrogated by Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). The 
Court wrote that “[t]he term ‘religion’ has reference to one’s views of his relations to his 
Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of 
obedience to his will.” Id. at 342. That view held sway for a time, even though the Supreme 
Court made it clear that the theological implications of a given religion are not to be 
individually assessed. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (“The religious 
views espoused by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. 
But if those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or 
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.”). Even that 
standard, however, proved too stringent, as the Court eventually moved to focus simply on 
one’s conscience. See Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340 (holding that “[i]f an individual deeply and 
sincerely holds beliefs that are purely ethical or moral in source and content, but that 
nevertheless impose upon him a duty of conscience . . . those beliefs certainly occupy in the 
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any organization can claim the status of a “church” in the overarching legal 
tradition of American law.  
While there may be historical and cultural reasons for such an approach, 
the attitude has unavoidably extended to the IRC, to the cases interpreting 
and applying it, and to the special treatment afforded a “church” under 
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
56
 There is no actual definition of “church” in the IRC, so 
courts have often been called upon to determine what qualifies as a church 
or religion. The judiciary’s broad and accepting view of religion in other 
contexts, favoring inclusiveness over analytical heft, has routinely carried 
the day here as well. In De La Salle v. United States, for instance, the court 
stated that: 
                                                                                                                 
life of that individual ‘a place parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious 
persons”) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)); Tarasco v. Walsh, 
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961) (stating that “[n]either [federal nor state governments] can 
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-
believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as 
against those religions founded on different beliefs”). 
 56. There is a distinction between a “religious organization” and a “church” in that 
religious organizations may or may not receive tax-exempt status. In order to qualify as 
exempt, an organization must serve an exclusively exempt purpose. See Treas. Reg. 
1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2017). For example, the IRS has qualified a religious broadcasting 
station as a “religious organization” and granted it tax-exemption status under 501(c)(3) 
because it exclusively devoted broadcasting time to worship and other religious content 
without selling commercial or advertising time. See Rev. Rul. 78–385, 1978–2 C.B. 174; 
Rev. Rul. 68–563, 1968–2 C.B. 212. On the other hand, the Tax Court once held a 
purportedly religious book publisher non-exempt because it did not advance a religion and 
was simply a money making operation. Found. for Divine Meditation v. Comm’r, 24 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 411 (1965), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Parker v. Comm’r, 305 F.2d 792 
(8th Cir. 1966). Ultimately, both categories—religious organizations and churches—are 
subject to a very lax, “hands off” approach in most circumstances. See Kent Greenawalt, 
Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1843, 1844 (1998) (“The Supreme Court's basic constitutional approach . . . is that 
secular courts must not determine questions of religious doctrine and practice.”); Samuel J. 
Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious 
Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 85 (1997) (“In recent years, the United 
States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters 
that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and belief.”). This Article focuses on 
churches (and the integrated auxiliaries that are lumped with them for tax purposes), which 
do not have to apply for recognition of their tax-exempt status and do not have to file any 
annual filings. See, e.g., Mishchenko, supra note 18, at 1366. Distinctions between different 
kinds of religious organizations do not, however, ultimately affect the underlying problems 
or proposed solutions discussed in this Article.  
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[t]he term ‘church’ includes a religious order or a religious 
organization . . . if its duties include the ministration of sacerdotal 
functions and the conduct of religious worship. If . . . not . . . it is 
subject to the tax imposed . . . whether or not it engages in 
religious, educational, or charitable activities. . . . If a religious 
order or organization can fully meet the requirements . . . 
exemption . . . will apply to all its activities . . . .
 57
 
Building on this confusing articulation, the Tax Court later indicated that 
Congress intended the word church to be used in the “denomination” sense, 
not “in a generic or universal sense.”58 It then proceeded to articulate three 
varying definitions of the term stated: 
We think that . . . the concept of “church” appears to be 
synonymous with the concept of “denomination” . . . or “sect” 
rather than to be used in any universal sense. This is not to 
imply, however, that in order to be constituted a church, a group 




Judge Dawson, in a concurring opinion stated that, “[t]o be a ‘church’ a 
religious organization must engage in ‘the ministration of sacerdotal 
functions and the conduct of religious worship’ in accordance with ‘the 
tenets and practices of a particular religious body.’”60 Judge Tannenwald 
wrote a second concurring opinion, giving rise to what has become known 
as the “associational test.”61 Essentially, he emphasized the importance of a 
congregational element when deciding whether an organization is a church: 
In my opinion, the word “church” implies that an otherwise 
qualified organization bring people together as the principal 
means of accomplishing its purpose. The objects of such 
gatherings need not be conversion to a particular faith or 
segment of a faith nor the propagation of the views of a 
particular denomination or sect. The permissible purpose may be 
accomplished individually and privately in the sense that oral 
manifestation is not necessary, but it may not be accomplished in 
                                                                                                                 
 57. 195 F. Supp. 891, 900–01 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (emphasis added).  
 58. Chapman v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 358, 363 (1967). 
 59. See id. (emphasis added).  
 60. Id. at 366–67 (Dawson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  
 61. See id. at 367-69 (Tannenwald, J., concurring opinion). 
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physical solitude. A man may, of course, pray alone, but, in such 
a case, though his house may be a castle, it is not a ‘church.’62 
Perceiving the confusion inherent in these potentially incongruent 
standards, the IRS developed its own list of fourteen criteria to evaluate 
whether an organization qualifies as a “church.”63 These criteria include (1) 
distinct legal existence, (2) recognized creed and form of worship, (3) 
definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (4) formal code of doctrine 
and discipline, (5) distinct religious history, (6) membership not associated 
with any other church or denomination, (7) organization of ordained 
ministers, (8) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed 
courses of study, (9) literature of its own, (10) established places of 
worship, (11) regular congregations, (12) regular religious services, (13) 
Sunday schools for the religious instruction of the young, and (14) schools 
for the preparation of its members.
64
 Unfortunately, these criteria are 
neither predictive nor controlling.
65
 But some guidance is better than none, 
and the courts have relied on this list at times, frequently citing the “regular 
congregation” as the most important factor.66  
                                                                                                                 
 62. Id. at 367 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added).  
 63. This list was made public in a 1978 speech given by IRS Commissioner Jerome 
Kurtz. See IRS News Release, IR-1930 (1978); Jerome Kurtz, Comm’r, IRS, Remarks at the 
PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax Planning (Jan. 9, 1978), reprinted in Fed. Taxes 
(P–H) ¶ 54,820 (1978) [hereinafter Remarks at the PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax 
Planning]; IRS PUB. NO. 1828, TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT ENTITIES, EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS, 501(C)(3): TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 33 
(2015).  
 64. Remarks at the PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax Planning, supra note 63. 
 65. The IRS itself acknowledges that the list is merely a guide and that “few, if any, 
religious organizations . . . could satisfy all of [the] criteria.” Id. The associational test 
articulated by Judge Tannenwald essentially makes the “regular congregation” factor 
(number 12, above) a controlling factor. 
 66. See, e.g., Am. Guidance Found. v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 304, 306 (D.D.C. 
1980); Found. of Human Understanding v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1341, 1359 (1987). In 
American Guidance Foundation, the court elaborated on Judge Tannenwald’s concurring 
opinion in Chapman and explicitly created the associational test:  
While some of [the 14 criteria] are relatively minor, others, e. g. the existence 
of an established congregation served by an organized ministry, the provision 
of regular religious services and religious education for the young, and the 
dissemination of a doctrinal code, are of central importance. The means by 
which an avowedly religious purpose is accomplished separates a “church” 
from other forms of religious enterprise. . . . At a minimum, a church includes a 
body of believers or communicants that assembles regularly in order to 
worship. Unless the organization is reasonably available to the public in its 
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That said, the system is no closer to effectively policing tax issues and 
potential abuse of exemption laws by churches. The main reason for this 
problem is that, even with some IRS guidance, the U.S. government has 
steadfastly maintained a reluctance to policing this issue, and courts have 
never settled on a single, controlling standard.
67
 “[W]e disavow any 
intimations in this case defining or limiting what constitutes a church 
under . . . any provision of the Internal Revenue Code.”68 
More importantly, the IRS seemingly does not bother with its own 
patina-of-a-test; the agency instead permits individual organizations to 
decide whether they constitute a “church” and refuses to police those 
decisions.
69
 Typically, an organization claiming to meet the requirements of 
                                                                                                                 
conduct of worship, its educational instruction, and its promulgation of 
doctrine, it cannot fulfill this associational role. 
Id. at 306 (citing Chapman, 48 T.C. at 367). A year later, in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. South Dakota, the Supreme Court cemented the importance of this test, stating 
that “[t]he word ‘church’ . . . must be construed, instead, to refer to the congregation.” 451 
U.S. 772, 784 (1981). 
 67. See Mishchenko, supra note 18, at 1367–69.  
 68. St. Martin Evangelical, 451 U.S. at 784 n.15. All the “test” really requires, then, is 
some regular assembly of individuals related by faith. See Riker v. Comm’r, 244 F.2d 220 
(9th Cir. 1957); Chapman v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 358 (1967); Am. Guidance Found., 490 F. 
Supp. at 304; De La Salle Inst. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961). The 
definition of such assembly, or congregation, is itself extremely generous; indeed, even a 
group of two or three people may qualify. See, e.g., Church of Eternal Life, 86 T.C. 916, 
924–25 (1986) (noting that “incipient churches may have only two or three gathered 
together”). Even an aspirational church would likely grow beyond that, given its 
“associational role,” but such growth is not necessarily required. The naked requirement 
remains very, very bare. See id.; see also Found. of Human Understanding v. United States, 
614 F.3d 1383, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he associational test does not demand that 
religious gatherings be held with a particular frequency or on a particular schedule . . . .”); 
Purnell v. Comm’r, 63 T.C.M. (CCH) 3037 (1992) (holding that The Kingdom of God 
Headquarters Church qualified as a church because the organization had a place of worship; 
regular congregations; regular religious services; and their own, religious creed, literature, 
and doctrine). 
 69. See, e.g., Sarah Eekhoff Zylstra, Why the IRS Has Stopped Auditing Churches – 
Even One that Calls President Obama a Muslim, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Oct. 26, 2012), 
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2012/october-web-only/why-irs-has-stopped-auditing-
churches-even-one-that-calls-p.html; see also Philip T. Hackney, Charitable Organization 
Oversight: Rules v. Standards, 13 PITT. TAX REV. 83, 98–99 (2015) (“In most years the IRS 
audits less than one percent of the existing charitable organization population.”). This is at 
least partially due to the fact that churches do not have to file any return and are simply 
assumed exempt. See, e.g., ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 39, at 743 (citing I.R.C. § 508(a), 
(b) (2012)). 
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§ 501(c)(3) must file an application for approval by the IRS.
70
 But this 
requirement is puzzlingly dropped for churches.
71
 Churches simply need 
not file an application for exemption under § 501(c)(3).
72
 Bookending this 
kid-glove treatment of qualification issues, churches can only be audited in 




                                                                                                                 
 70. See JODY BLAZEK, TAX PLANNING AND COMPLIANCE FOR TAX EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS (5th ed. Supp. 2016). 
 71. But see ZELINSKY, supra note 51, at 113-56 (arguing that taxation of churches risks 
undue entanglement). This is an adequate response to the frustrations expressed herein. If 
one posits that the government should never pressure churches in any manner, then that is 
effectively the end of the argument. This Article rests on an implicit assumption that 
churches, like every other entity, can be taxed without being destroyed or impermissibly 
directed by governmental authorities. That assumption appears to be well-grounded in the 
current law as churches are taxed, albeit at reduced rates or in inconsistent ways. See supra 
note 39. A broader discussion of that assumption is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 72. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 1828: TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES & RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2015). Nevertheless, many churches still apply primarily because without 
an IRS letter that recognizes exemption under 501(c)(3), tax-exemption status is only a 
rebuttable presumption. See NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, UNDERSTANDING NONPROFIT AND TAX 
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 116 (2d. ed. 2012). 
 73. See I.R.C. § 7611 (2012). This section is explicitly intended to protect churches 
from the IRS. 
Section 7611's purpose is to “minimize IRS contacts with churches to only 
those necessary to insure compliance with the tax laws.” To begin an inquiry 
into a possible section 501(c)(3) violation by a church, “an appropriate high-
level Treasury official [must] reasonably believe[] (on the basis of facts and 
circumstances recorded in writing) that the church . . . may not be exempt . . . .” 
The Service must send notice of the inquiry in writing and must include “the 
concerns which gave rise to such inquiry.” Churches must also be given the 
opportunity to have a conference with appropriate members of the Service's 
investigation team in advance of the investigation. 
 Once the initial inquiry becomes a formal investigation, section 7611 
presumptively protects church records, restricting review of the records only to 
the extent necessary. This restriction imposes a higher burden on the Service to 
demonstrate necessity. To show that requested documents are necessary, the 
Service must “(1) show that the purposes of the investigation are proper, and 
(2) explain how the particular documents, or categories of documents, (a) fall 
directly and logically within the scope of those purposes and (b) will help 
significantly to further an investigation within the scope of those purposes.” 
The law also imposes a two year limit on the total time for investigation. 
Leslie S. Garthwaite, An End to Politically Motivated Audits of Churches-How Amendment 
to Section 7217 Can Preserve Integrity in the Tax Investigation of Churches Under Section 
7611, 60 TAX LAW. 503, 509 (2007) (footnotes omitted). 
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Because organizations can easily qualify for church status, and neither 
the IRS nor any other government agency is interested in reviewing that 
qualification, the IRS is handcuffed when it comes to approaching such an 
entity in any fashion.
74
 The lack of transparency and accountability is even 
deeper: any entity that “qualifies” as a “church” is granted the protection of 
near total secrecy, even from the IRS.  
Charitable organizations are generally required to file Form 990, the 
Return of Organization Exempt from Income Tax, which lays out a tax-
exempt organization’s gross income, receipts, and disbursements.75 The IRS 
views this form as the “primary tax compliance tool for tax-exempt 
organizations.”76 This is intuitive—that which is not monitored cannot be 
policed. However, this filing requirement is simply dropped when it comes 
to “churches.”77 As such, nobody has the ability to track the expenditures of 
churches to determine whether they are pursuing or furthering “charitable” 




In the end, the result is a carefully constructed sheath of 
unaccountability, ensuring that purported religious organizations are 
afforded an extraordinarily robust tax status that allows churches to raise 
and spend funds without public accountability.
79
 This system means that the 
                                                                                                                 
 74. See, e.g., Mathew Encino, Holy Profits: How Federal Law Allows for the Abuse of 
the Church Tax-Exempt Status, 14 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 78, 85–86 (2014) (explaining that 
churches are exempt from filing Form 1023, the application for 501(c)(3) status). 
 75. See Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 109. Private Foundations are required to file 
Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable 
Trust Treated as a Private Foundation. This requirement was first imposed in the Revenue 
Act of 1943. See Revenue Act of 1943, ch. 63, § 117(a), 58 Stat. 21, 36–37 (1944). 
 76. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., BACKGROUND PAPER, SUMMARY OF FORM 990 REDESIGN 
PROCESS 1 (2008), http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-tege/summary_form_990_redesign_ 
process.pdf. 
 77. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 11283J, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 990 RETURN OF 
ORGANIZATION EXEMPT FROM INCOME TAX 3 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/i990.pdf (exempting churches and certain church-affiliated organizations from filing). 
Also exempted from filling out a “full” Form 990 are certain organizations with relatively 
smaller revenues and/or fewer assets. Id. at 4 (indicating that such organizations can fill out 
the less onerous 990-EZ or 990-N forms).  
 78. Montague, supra note 51, at 230–31 (noting that the exemption from disclosure was 
not initially imposed because Congress was not concerned about churches competing with 
private business, a concern that only later came to the fore).  
 79. The disclosure requirement has changed somewhat over the years. As presently 
constituted, it exempts “churches” and “integrated auxiliaries” from filing, but it does not 
exempt “religious organizations.” Samuel D. Brunson, The Present, Past, and Future of LDS 
Financial Transparency, DIALOGUE: A JOURNAL OF MORMON THOUGHT, Spring 2015, at 7. 
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government has no consistent, documented proof as to the size of the tax 
subsidy afforded to churches or whether that public investment is paying 
off.
80
 The result of this lack of transparency and accountability is precisely 
what one would guess: there is substantial evidence that the amount of 
money being funneled to ostensible churches is enormous and that it is not 
being used in a traditionally charitable manner.  
Again, the LDS Church serves as a helpful example. According to the 
church itself, it gave approximately $1.3 billion in humanitarian aid 
between 1985 and 2010.
81
 That is little, however, compared to the funds it 
raised during that time. Recall that the church likely generates somewhere 
around $8 billion per year in tithing, and reasonable estimates suggest that 
the church raised more than $100 billion between 1985 and 2010.
82
 That 
means that the church gave less than 2% of its incoming funds to charity.
83
  
                                                                                                                 
“An ‘integrated auxiliary’ is a tax-exempt organization that is affiliated with a church, but 
does not offer goods or services to the general public.” Id. at 7 n.28 (citing Treas. Reg. 
§1.6033-2(h)(1)(2011)). This obviously broadens exemption from disclosure and was 
apparently included in current law at the instance of Senator Wallace F. Bennett of Utah in 
order to protect a variety of LDS Church entities from disclosure requirements. See id. 
 80. There are some limitations on this lax oversight of religious spending and 
investment. Part III, infra, explains a number of these limitations in its discussion of private 
foundation spending rules and the UBIT and how those concepts should inform future 
policymakers’ approaches to the taxation of churches.  
 81. Winter et al., Money Behind the Mormon Message, supra note 13.  
 82. Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, supra note 4. But see Kaimi Wenger, 
Business Week’s Erroneous Claim About LDS Charitable Giving, TIMES & SEASONS (July 
11, 2012), http://www.timesandseasons.org/harchive/2012/07/business-weeks-erroneous-
claim-about-lds-charitable-giving/.  
 83. Again, to be fair, see supra note 49, discussing the potentially fluid definition of 
“charity.” To the extent one focuses on material aid to the needy, and underscoring the 
paucity of the numbers discussed in the text, only one-third of that amount was actually 
monetary assistance, and the $100 billion figure does not include other sources of revenue or 
income. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 16; Winter, How the Mormons Make Money, 
supra note 4. Indeed, even this assessment might be overly generous, as some estimates 
indicate the church donates less than 1% of its annual income to charity. Wenger, supra note 
82 (citing Professor Ryan T. Cragun for the proposition that the church gives only 0.7% to 
charity). This kind of giving is marked but sees some parallels in other churches. See infra 
notes 83-84 and accompanying text. It also compares unfavorably even to the worst non-
church charities. See, e.g., Kris Hundley & Kendall Taggard, America’s 50 Worst Charities 
Rake in Nearly $1 Billion Dollars for Corporate Fundraisers, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 2, 
2017, 4:10 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/nation/americas-50-worst-charities-rake-
in-nearly-1-billion-for-corporate/2339540 (indicating that these charities collectively paid 
out less than 4% of their donations in direct cash aid). 
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Though a striking example, the LDS Church is certainly not alone. For 
instance, the United Methodist Church is believed to have spent “about 29 
percent of its revenues [on] charitable causes in 2010 (about $62 million of 
$214 million received).”84 Similarly, some estimates indicate that annual 
spending by the American division of the Catholic Church was $170 billion 
in 2010 and that just 2.7% went directly toward national charitable 
activities.
85
 Indeed, examples are legion, and this appears to be a 
widespread issue (as one would expect given the tax-induced economic 
incentives outlined herein).
86
 Recognizing this problem, Senator Chuck 
Grassley sent letters to leaders of six large churches in 2007, asking them to 
disclose the kind of information that Form 990 would typically reveal.
87
 
According to the Senator, this number could have been higher—he chose 
these churches based on media reports regarding luxury purchases like 
corporate jets and $23,000 commodes.
88
 A recent survey found that there 
were 1210 megachurches in the United States in 2005, nearly double the 
number from five years earlier, and a follow-up survey found that the 
average 2008 income of such churches was $6.5 million, only a quarter of 
which went to missions and programs.
89
 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Cragun et al., supra note 40, at 40 (citing United Methodist Church Gen. Council of 
Fin. And Admin., Financial Commitment Report (Dec. 2010)). 
 85. See Earthly Concerns, supra note 20 (reviewing bankruptcy diocesan bankruptcy 
filings). However, it is notable that this number does not include amounts that went to 
hospitals and schools, functions that likely fit within the general scope of charitable activities 
that the government would otherwise have to pay for. See id. The Catholic Church is a 
history-spanning entity with enormous spiritual, social, cultural, and political impact. It is 
difficult to analyze its impact in this Article given its size, global manifestation, and the 
millennia of secrecy surrounding its economic and political dealings. See generally GERALD 
POSNER, GOD’S BANKERS: A HISTORY OF MONEY AND POWER AT THE VATICAN (2015). 
 86. See, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at 218-20 (discussing numerous financial 
scandals involving churches).  
 87. Chuck Grassley, Grassley Seeks Information from Six Media-Based Ministries, U.S. 
SENATE COMM. ON FIN. (Nov. 6, 2007), https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-members-
news/grassley-seeks-information-from-six-media-based-ministries. 
 88. Laurie Goodstein, Senator Questioning Ministries on Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/us/07ministers.html. Only two of the churches 
responded timely. Two responded late and only partially—one simply never responded. Id. 
For even more extreme examples of bad acts relating to taxation issues, see Church of 
Scientology of Cal. v. Comm’r, 83 T.C. 381, 505 (1984) (finding that “in the pursuit of 
[conspiring to impede the IRS, the church] filed false tax returns, burglarized IRS offices, 
stole IRS documents, and harassed, delayed, and obstructed IRS agents who tried to audit 
Church records”). 
 89. Scott Thumma et al., Megachurches Today 2005: Summary of Research Findings, 
HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGIOUS RES. (2005), http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/ 
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Though extreme, these kinds of purchases and this sort of behavior is 
merely representative of how little many churches spend on actual charity. 
“One calculation of the resources expended by 271 U.S. congregations 
found that, on average, ‘operating expenses’ totaled 71 percent of all the 
expenditures of religions, much of that going to pay ministers’ salaries.”90 
Again, this statistic compares unfavorably with a number of other, non-
church charities.
91
 If nothing else, it brings into doubt the concept that 
churches are particularly effective channels for charitable giving and that 
they should be treated differently from any other § 501(c)(3) organization. 
It bears repeating that the subsidies involved in this issue are huge. 
Though it is not possible to assign concrete numbers because churches are 
not required to file annual forms with the IRS or to otherwise disclose their 
finances, some calculations are possible. Assuming that most organized 
religions would be taxed at the maximum federal corporate tax rate (based 
on revenue), the annual federal income tax subsidy is approximately $35 
billion and the annual state income tax subsidy is about $6 billion per 
year.
92
 Additionally, churches pay little or no property tax on explicitly 
religious property (such as churches and temples) and a reduced rate on 
many other kinds of property.
93
 This amounts to an additional subsidy of 
more than $25 billion per year.
94
 On top of these exemptions, religions pay 
little or reduced capital gains tax; religious functionaries can opt out of self-
employment taxes; and ministers benefit from the “parsonage exemption,” 
which permits churches to pay the cost of their living arrangements without 
                                                                                                                 
megastoday2005_summaryreport.html; Scott Thumma & Warren Bird, Changes in 
American Megachurches: Tracing Eight Years of Growth and Innovation in the Nation’s 
Largest-Attendance Congregations, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGIOUS RES. (2008), 
http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/megastoday2008_summaryreport.html.  
 90. Cragun et al., supra note 40, at 40 (citing CHRISTIAN SMITH ET AL., PASSING THE 
PLATE: WHY AMERICAN CHRISTIANS DON’T GIVE AWAY MORE MONEY (2008)). This sort of 
accounting is particularly galling when compared to explicitly for-profit companies that give 
away vastly more to charity than many churches. Id. (pointing out that Wal-Mart gives 
approximately “$1.75 billion in food aid to charities each year, or twenty-eight times all of 
the money allotted for charity by the United Methodist Church and almost double what the 
LDS Church has given in the last twenty-five years”). 
 91. Id. (noting that the American Red Cross spends 92.1% of its revenue on the physical 
needs of those it aims to help—an amount that is 130 times higher than the comparable 
spend rate of the LDS Church). 
 92. Id. at 42.  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
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 In sum, these subsidies conservatively amount to over $71 
billion per year in exemptions.
96
 
In the end, the Code is not functioning as intended, as massive amounts 
of money escape government taxation but do not flow to charity. But the 
problem does not end there. 
II. Even the Right Thing Gets Crooked
97
 
Aside from the enormous, ineffectual expense of subsidizing organized 
religion, another reason to question the exemptions afforded to churches is 
that these tax-free funds, when left unaudited and unchecked, flood the 
economy and fundamentally distort free markets.
98
 The idea is 
straightforward but subtle: every market actor (whether or not ostensibly for 
profit) undertakes a return-on-investment analysis to assess economic 
options, which inherently assesses its effective, after-tax rate of return. Of 
course, that analysis is simpler for entities like churches that do not, in fact, 
pay taxes. Given that these organizations are permitted to funnel tens of 
billions of untaxed dollars into the economy, they can engage in a 
quantitatively different kind of analysis, which ultimately affects their 
positioning in a competitive market environment and the economic options 
available to every other actor therein. 
A. Return on Investment 
Any entity contemplating any expenditure or investment must undertake 
a return-on-investment analysis to determine whether the outlay is 
justified.
99
 The general idea is straightforward: decision-makers must 
decide whether a given investment will generate enough money to justify 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. at 43; Frances E. McNair & Nina S. Collum, Tax Planning to Take Advantage of 
Unique Benefits for Clergy, 24 J. TAX’N INV. 238 (2007) (“[F]or ministers of the gospel, 
gross income does not include a housing allowance paid as part of the compensation to the 
extent that the allowance is used to rent or provide a home and to the extent that the 
allowance does not exceed the fair rental value of the home . . . .”). 
 96. Cragun et al., supra note 40, at 44. 
 97. St. Arsenie Boca.  
 98. See What Is “Market Distortion”, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/m/marketdistortion.asp#ixzz5Suzxlbqf (last visited Oct. 3, 2018) (“[A]lmost all types 
of taxes and subsidies . . . can cause a market distortion.”).  
 99. See Joe Knight, The Most Common Mistake People Make in Calculating ROI, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 9, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/04/the-most-common-mistake-people-
make-in-calculating-roi. Non-controversially, the goal is to return a profit, while pricing in 
the risk of the proposition. 
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the risk associated with that investment.
100
 There is, of course, a 
relationship between return on investment and risk such that riskier 
undertakings require a higher rate of return to compensate for the higher 
likelihood of loss.
101
 Intuitively, this means that riskier investments must 
yield higher rates of return or the market will favor less risky, more stable 
investment options. Of course, each entity has an internal “benchmark” rate 
of return driven by a host of factors below which it will not invest.
102
 One 
of those factors critical to this discussion is the cost of capital to the entity 
(which depends on the tax applied to investors).
103
 Before delving into that 
issue, it is important to understand the wide applicability of the rate-of-
return analysis; it affects churches in precisely the same way as every other 
kind of investing entity.  
Initially, it may be tempting to view all kinds of financial analyses—
including rate of return models—as solely the province of traditional profit-
seeking entities. Indeed, it is easier to understand this kind of inquiry in a 
traditional context, such as that of a traditional corporation. Such an entity 
is, after all, a collection of individual economic interests and therefore must 
continually monitor the return on investment it is generating for its 
constituent stakeholders (who must be able to continually monitor whether 
to continue investing in the organization). A simple example suffices to 
demonstrate. Let us assume a corporation—which we will call X Corp.—is 
faced with the decision of whether to invest $5 million into a residential 
housing development. To make that decision, X Corp. must decide what 
sort of return that investment will yield and determine whether such a return 
is sufficient for its investors.
104
 Shareholder B, for example, will withdraw 
her money from X Corp. and move it elsewhere if X Corp. cannot generate a 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See id.  
 101. See, e.g., Ira Mark Bloom, The Treatment of Trust and Other Partial Interests of the 
Surviving Spouse Under the Redesigned Elective-Share System: Some Concerns and 
Suggestions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 941, 963 n.93 (1992) (“[R]eturn on investment is related to 
risk . . . .”).  
 102. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 110, 126 (2002) (describing how a hypothetical taking would attempt to mimic 
the internal benchmark of the regulated company to ensure fairness).  
 103. Knight, supra note 99; see also Michael T. Jacobs & Anil Shivdasani, Do You Know 
Your Cost of Capital?, HARV. BUS. REV. (July-Aug. 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/07/do-you-
know-your-cost-of-capital. 
 104. See, e.g., Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of 
Corporate Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511, 531 n.150 (2004) (“[Equity capital markets] are the 
vehicle by which shareholders bargain over the terms of their equity investment contract 
with the corporation.”).  
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sufficient return on Shareholder B’s invested funds.105 X Corp., then, is 
continually assessing its investment options in terms of whether it can 
generate the kinds of returns that Shareholder B and its other investors 
demand. The situation is a good deal more complex-corporations and waves 
of individual investors continually evaluate investment opportunities and 
strategies. But the overarching principle is straightforward: if a corporation 
does not adequately evaluate its options and generate an adequate return for 
its investors, those investors will move elsewhere. 
That is a relatively easy-to-understand narrative given the ubiquity of 
corporate (or other collective) investment in the modern economy. 
However—and most importantly—that kind of investment analysis is not 
limited to traditional companies or corporate collectives. In fact, this return-
on-investment analysis is necessary for every person or entity that invests. 
This includes individuals, churches, and every other kind of investor, 
regardless of whether they have constituent owners or stakeholders. 
Admittedly, it seems odd to conceptualize a church engaging in the kind 
of return-based analysis described above given that churches do not really 
have to consider whether they are able to generate an actual return. But this 
is irrelevant. What is key is that every rational market actor has to analyze 
the opportunity costs of any investment and so engage in a return-on-
investment analysis. There is simply no other way to determine what 
investments to make. Put differently, any person or entity pursuing market-
based returns has to evaluate which activities generate higher returns.
106
 
That is, even though a church has no analogue to Shareholder B, it still has 
to decide what to invest in so that it can maximize its own resources. Every 
time a church is faced with a market-facing investment or expense, it has to 
decide whether to proceed or turn elsewhere. Deciding what to invest in 
means comparing investment opportunities, which requires assigning return 
metrics to them and deciding which are superior.  
                                                                                                                 
 105. In other words, X Corp. must overcome Z’s opportunity costs of investing with X 
Corp.—that is, the return Z could generate elsewhere. Opportunity costs can include non-
monetary returns, such as the positive feelings generated by investing in an environmentally 
friendly corporation, but this is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 106. You could invest randomly or only in certain companies or opportunities that match 
extrinsic criteria (e.g., companies that do not produce carbon or real estate investment trusts 
that focus on rebuilding inner-city areas), but doing so necessarily means that you are not 
investing to maximize market returns, which is contrary to basic economic assumptions. See, 
e.g., Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 
VA. L. REV. 605, 616 (1989) (“[N]onprofit firms that own unrelated businesses presumably 
have much the same kind of interest in those firms that any other owner would have—
namely, to maximize the financial return they yield.”). 
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Assume, then, that Church X is now the entity faced with deciding 
whether to invest $5 million in a residential housing development. Just like 
X Corp., it will have to decide whether the investment is “worth it” because, 
just like X Corp., it will have to determine the amount of money it will 
recover in proceeds. There are many ways to conduct this analysis, but it 
must be done in some fashion, because all rational, profit-seeking actors 
seek to understand and maximize their return and cannot do so unless they 
evaluate the different kinds of returns available to them. Simply put, as a 
matter of basic economic necessity, every church that acts in an 




 That is not to say, however, that there is no difference between the 
market impact of a corporation and a church. Indeed, the tax exemption 
embedded in all such analyses undertaken by churches, as opposed to 
traditional for-profit corporations, ends up creating significant, and 
historically underappreciated, distortions. These distortions effectively 
permit churches to undercut other market actors to the detriment of the 
entire economy.  
B. Economic Distortions 
When a corporation evaluates the return on investment required by its 
shareholders, it must do so in contemplation of the taxes those shareholders 
will pay.
108
 This may or may not be explicit, but investors evaluate their 
investments in terms of what will ultimately come to them, which 
necessarily involves tax calculations.
109
  
Let us again consider X Corp. and Shareholder B. X Corp. must evaluate 
whether to invest its $5 million on behalf of Shareholder B in the residential 
                                                                                                                 
 107. The only substantial difference, as noted above, is that the church will undertake the 
analysis for itself rather than on behalf of any shareholder or investor. In fact, a church will 
have a more direct, less complicated analysis than a traditional corporation because the 
church does not have to consider the return it is generating for someone else (and, 
concomitantly, whether that return is sufficient to ensure ongoing, or future, investment). 
 108. See Johgho Kim, Bankruptcy Law Dilemma: Appraisal of Corporate Value and Its 
Distribution in Corporate Reorganization Proceedings, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 119, 161 
n.225 (2009) (“The cost of capital is used by shareholders to see if the corporation is 
delivering a sufficient return, bearing in mind the risks of the business. It is the 
compensation that corporations must provide investors in return for the use of their 
capital.”). From the shareholder’s perspective, that compensation will be post-tax. 
 109. See Jacobs & Shivdasani, supra note 103 (“{W]hether a company uses its marginal 
or effective tax rates in computing its cost of debt will greatly affect the outcome of its 
investment decisions.”). 
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housing development or some investment alternative. Very simply, this 
means that X Corp. must decide whether the investment will generate a 
sufficient return to Shareholder B.
110
 Assume that the analysis reveals that 
the investment will return $500,000 per year (or, seemingly, a 10% return 
per year). The question ultimately is whether that $500,000 is “enough” to 
entice Shareholder B to invest in, and keep her capital in, X Corp.  
Here is where taxes come into play. Although Shareholder B is 
demanding a particular return, her demand has her individual tax structure 
built into it. She does not have the benefit of receiving her funds tax-free 
and proceeding to invest from there. Instead, her return must be sufficient to 
justify the investment she makes of her already-taxed funds. Shareholder B, 
in evaluating whether a $500,000 return is sufficient, will view it not as a 
return on $500,000 but as a return on the money that she had to earn in 
order to generate $500,000 of investable capital. Shareholder B is granted 
no special exemption like the Church and so has to pay taxes on her 
income. Assume that her effective rate is 20%.
111
 That means she actually 
had to earn $6,250,000 in order to invest $5,000,000 into X Corp. As such, 
the real return-on-investment calculation—made by X Corp. on behalf of 
Shareholder B—is whether a $500,000 return on a $6,250,000 investment is 
sufficient. If Shareholder B (and the wider market she is representing in our 
stripped-down example) has set a benchmark return of 10%, then X Corp. 
will not be able to pursue the housing project and will have to look 
elsewhere to achieve the kinds of returns demanded by Shareholder B.
112
  
Now, a careful observer might ask why the housing development would 
return only 10%. If X Corp.—as the embodiment of our hypothetical 
Shareholder B and the aggregation of the wider market—is not willing to 
invest in the housing development, is it not the case that the return on 
investment will have to change? Of course, the nature of the investment 
will not change, but the cost might. If the developer and marketer of the 
development is asking $5,000,000, which effectively represents a return 
                                                                                                                 
 110. This example strips out the overhead costs associated with running an investment-
concentrating entity, such as a corporation. It also presumes that net profits will be returned 
to shareholders via direct distributions. In truth, a corporation is a complex entity, 
constituting a cost center in and of itself, and shareholders can reap gains through means 
other than direct distributions. That said, the fundamental concept behind entity aggregation 
is that shareholders invest based upon the ability of the entity to generate and return profit.  
 111. All examples assume basic, uncomplicated ordinary rates for ease of calculation and 
demonstration. 
 112. Effectively, then, X Corp. will have to either return $625,000 on Shareholder B’s 
investment or negotiate down the price of the housing opportunity so that it can pursue both 
that and another profit-returning endeavor. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/4
2019]       LET MY ARM BE BROKEN OFF AT THE ELBOW 483 
 
 
that falls below what the market is demanding, is it not the case that the 
developer will have to lower his asking price? After all, if X Corp. (as the 
vicarious embodiment of the market) will not pursue it, neither will any 
other corporation. 
The generic answer to the above question is “yes.” Yes, the hypothetical 
developer will have to lower his asking price because, by definition, we 
have stated that “the market” is not willing to pay $5,000,000.113 But this is 
where market distortion comes into play.  
We cannot answer “yes” because the tax code has split the “market” into 
two distinct segments—tax-exempt entities and everyone else.114 In other 
words, tax-exempt churches do not labor in the same post-tax world as 
everyone else, vicariously evaluating returns on behalf of individuals who 
are investing after-tax dollars.
115
 
Return to the earlier example. Recall that Shareholder B requires a 10% 
return on investment, and assume that a given church (which we will call 
“Church A”) has the same benchmark.116 This means that X Corp. and 
Church A, both on the hunt for investing opportunities, will evaluate every 
opportunity that presents itself based on this seemingly similar requirement. 
As we have seen, however, that seemingly similar requirement is anything 
but—Church A only needs a $500,000 return on its $5,000,000 investment, 
while X Corp. needs a $625,000 return on its $5,000,000 investment.  
The difference may not seem significant, but ultimately, it means that 
Church A will have an advantage in securing the “best,” or lowest-risk, 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Again, this is a simplistic example. Different market actors have different 
participants with different skill sets, different return requirements, and different perceptions 
of market conditions. That said, there is, at some point, a basic equilibrium, which represents 
the market and what it is willing to offer for a given opportunity. Here, the example 
minimizes all associated issues into X Corp. and its need to satisfy Shareholder B. 
 114. Of course, there are many different reasons that markets are not efficient. See What 
Is “Market Distortion,” supra note 98. This Article is focusing on only one. Also, it may 
well be the case that this particular problem is a wider one that involves more than just 
churches. The tax exemption afforded to a wide array of entities may, in fact, pull all non-
profit entities within the scope of the arguments presented herein. This Article, however, 
focuses only on churches for the various reasons already discussed herein.  
 115. Such investable funds are either donated or are themselves a return earned on other 
donated or invested funds (which were, themselves, donated). At their base, then, all such 
capital is donated and received by churches on a tax-free basis.  
 116. This actually seems like a relatively uncontroversial supposition. Assuming perfect 
markets with a general population of transient investors, all investors should theoretically 
settle upon a stable rate of return.  
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 Remember, in an efficient and equalized 
market, X Corp. will not pursue the investment opportunity because it does 
not provide the required level of return, but neither will anyone else. The 
hypothetical developer would have to lower his asking price so that the 
investment demanded will produce a return sufficient to provide 
Shareholder B with a 10% return on her pre-tax capital. But, so long as 
Church A can raise funds tax-free, the developer will not lower his asking 
price. Church A will be able to offer the full $5,000,000 and acquire the 
opportunity. Of course, Church A, perceiving that there are others in the 
market who are pressuring the price downward, will attempt to secure a 
lower price. If we assume that this opportunity is a desirable one, then 
Church A will always have an advantage over X Corp. This ability to offer 
more, as it recurs and saturates the market, will ineluctably put a distorting, 
downward pressure on returns.
118
 Sellers will not be pressured to the same 
                                                                                                                 
 117. “Best” is a pregnant term. Most easily conceptualized, it encompasses a reduced 
level of risk. Of course, risk and return are intertwined, and it is beyond the scope of this 
Article to disambiguate the two or otherwise discuss investment pricing. It suffices here to 
posit that there are opportunities that are more desirable than others. It is also useful to point 
out that this is not an entirely new concern, though the context raised herein is different from 
that previously discussed. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 included provisions meant to 
prevent a similar charitable advantage. See Sharpe, supra note 30, at 399–400 (“By 
financing the purchase of business assets with tax-free earnings generated by those assets, 
the exempt organization was placed in a unique position to pay a higher price than a taxable 
investor could afford with after tax dollars.” (citing S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 62–63 (1969), as 
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2091)). This Article argues that the basic unfairness—
easily seen in the context of a business owner selling his business to a non-profit in order to 
exploit the buyer’s tax exemption—applies to every for-profit activity undertaken by exempt 
entities utilizing their tax-exempted source of funds for all the reasons discussed herein. 
 118. Hansmann, supra note 106, at 611-12. A counter-argument is that, if this were so, 
then these exempt entities with lower costs of capital would have already displaced 
substantial parts of the market and that, because this has not happened, there must not be any 
actual, undue advantage. Relatedly, there may be an argument that any advantage would not 
lead to distortions because the advantaged entities would rationally participate in markets in 
a way that either would not drive down competing returns or would result in a gradual 
displacement that actually benefited profit-seeking businesses. See, e.g., id. at 609-12 (“In 
this way, it was said, whole industries might ultimately be captured by nonprofits.”). 
However, these are simplistic arguments that ultimately assume perfectly efficient actors. A 
truly efficient and perfectly informed entity may well deploy the tax-based cost-of-capital 
advantages identified here in either an all-consuming manner or a manner that does not 
lower prices or returns. However, no entity—much less a church—is perfectly efficient or 
informed. Cost of capital is merely one advantage. Non-tax-exempt entities will almost 
certainly have one or more of a variety of potential advantages at their disposal relative to a 
church: better management, better locations, superior goodwill, intellectual property, etc. As 
such, one would expect a tax-exempt church to deploy its advantages in an attempt to offset 
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This gets to the heart of the Article: that market distortion flows from 
unchecked exemption status.
120
 To be sure, this is not a very controversial 
conclusion. In essence, all this Article is arguing is that when one market 
participant is given access to cheaper capital it can underbid other market 
participants, and such underbidding has a cascading effect on the returns 
available in the marketplace.
121
 What is notable, though, is that this is 
precisely the situation that the United States tax code has created. Because 
of the secrecy afforded to churches by the IRC, these entities are free to 
raise funds and devote them to for-profit endeavors. And because of the 




Churches participate in the same economy as the rest of us, but they do 
so with a built-in advantage. This tax advantage distorts the broader 
economy and reduces the rates of return generally available in the 
                                                                                                                 
its relative disadvantages. In other words, it would maintain a position in the market 
disproportionate to its economic standing despite its disadvantaged position, thus driving 
prices lower than they should go. The market distortion that is the focus of this Article is 
seen most clearly in the difference between a market with tax-advantaged players and a 
market without them. Ours is an imperfect an inefficient economy. The fact that churches 
have not entirely subsumed any identifiable market is, then, not surprising. 
 119. Of course, downward pressure on prices will harm sellers but help buyers. In this 
sense, the market may be unaffected, on balance. However, any tax-induced distortion will 
inflict some sort of inefficiency, whether it is introducing long-term investors (who do not 
sell to others) to the market or inducing churches to pursue opportunities that they are 
otherwise ill suited to exploit. The distortion is, by itself, problematic.  
 120. This concept has been identified by others but seems to have escaped a broader 
review as the result, perhaps, of the impermanent tax-exempt status of the investing entity 
itself. Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-Exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker 
Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-Financed Income, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 225, 260 (2012) 
(“A tax-exempt entity can afford to pay a higher price because it can purchase assets with 
untaxed money. . . . The ability of a tax-exempt entity to outbid taxable persons . . . derives 
from the tax-exempt entity’s exemption from tax . . . .”). 
 121. It is worth pointing out that this is an enormous amount of capital. Figures are 
available for as recently as 2011, when donors gave over $90 billion to religious 
organizations. See Montague, supra note 51, at 206. 
 122. For another excellent example of the unfairness baked into our current system of 
taxation that favors churches and other tax-exempt organizations, see Brunson, supra note 
120, at 227 n.7 (noting that an IRS consultant in 2002 estimated the United States was losing 
$70 billion every year in taxes from offshore tax evasion measures). 
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 And this is all the more galling because it is accomplished via a 
tax subsidy. In the end, churches have convinced the American taxpayer to 
handicap himself at his own expense. 
III. There Is No New Thing Under the Sun
124
 
There are two relatively straightforward solutions that, considered in 
combination, would begin to remedy the systemic market distortions caused 
by tax-exempt investment entities. Neither of these proposals is entirely 
new—they come directly from the IRC, having been adopted in other 
contexts in an effort to avoid the very difficulties already discussed.
 
 
First, and most simply, Congress should amend the IRC (and the 
accompanying regulations and IRS processes and procedures) to require 
churches to file Form 990.
125
 This requires no imagination, nor is it novel in 
any way, yet it would have an enormous effect. It is apparent, when 
reviewing the behavior of churches, that a substantial part of the reason that 
they behave the way they do is because they can do so without 
repercussion.
126
 “Everybody knows that corruption thrives in secret places, 
                                                                                                                 
 123. This conclusion also mimics the long-standing complaint of those who argue that 
churches have been permitted to distort the political realm for too long. See, e.g., Elizabeth 
Fleet, Madison’s “Detached Memoranda,” 3 WM. & MARY Q. 534, 556–60 (1946) (arguing 
that the ecclesiastical tax exemption must be ended to prevent churches from amassing vast 
fortunes and unduly influencing the political realm); see also Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, 
It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 143 (2016). The argument also echoes an earlier one made by President Grant: 
In 1850, I believe the church properties in the United States which paid no 
taxes, municipal or State, amounted to about $83,000,000. In 1860 the amount 
had doubled; in 1875 it is about $1,000,000,000. By 1900, without check, it is 
safe to say this property will reach a sum exceeding $3,000,000,000. So vast a 
sum, receiving all the protection and benefits of Government without bearing 
its proportion of the burdens and expenses of the same, will not be looked upon 
acquiescently by those who have to pay the taxes. 
Ulysses S. Grant, State of the Union Message (Dec. 7, 1875), in 2 THE STATE OF THE UNION 
MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS 1790-1996, at 1296 (Fred. L. Israel ed., 1966).  
 124. Ecclesiastes 1:9 (King James). 
 125. Any iteration of Form 990 would suffice so long as the document requires a basic 
disclosure of money raised and a categorized description of expenses and investments. This 
is in contrast to other proposals, which would leave church-tax advantages in place but 
substantially narrow the definition of “church.” See, e.g., Mishchenko, supra note 18, at 
1369–80. 
 126. Indeed, this is reinforced even when comparing churches to other types of charities. 
These other entities, which also enjoy the ability to raise capital tax-free, participate in 
markets and so also affect rates of return. But they appear to do so at vastly lower rates and 
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and avoids public places, and . . . it [is] a fair presumption that secrecy 
means impropriety.”127  
Why is it that some churches expend less than 5% of the funds donated 
to them on charity? Because they can. It seems unlikely that any church or 
other entity would so brazenly flaunt the underlying purpose of its 
charitable tax subsidy if such behavior were widely known to both that 
church’s tithe-payers and to the tax-paying public. At the very least, no 
entity would do so for long, as its actions would drive away donors or spur 
legislative and executive authorities to action. 
This is precisely why Form 990 exists in its present incarnation.
128
 
Commenting about a recent amendment to Form 990, the IRS 
Commissioner indicated that one of the IRS’s priorities in redesigning the 
form was “to enhance transparency of the nonprofit sector by requiring 
                                                                                                                 
thus have a significantly less distorting effect on the economy. Cragun et al., supra note 40, 
at 40. The authors point out the relative giving rates of a number of relevant entities: 
 For instance, the [LDS Church], which regularly trumpets its charitable 
donations, gave about $1 billion to charitable causes between 1985 and 2008. 
That may seem like a lot until you divide it by the twenty-three-year time span 
and realize this church is donating only about 0.7 percent of its annual income. 
Other religions are more charitable. For instance, the United Methodist Church 
allocated about 29 percent of its revenues to charitable causes in 2010 . . . . One 
calculation of the resources expended by 271 U.S. congregations found that, on 
average, “operating expenses” totaled 71 percent of all the expenditures of 
religions, much of that going to pay ministers’ salaries. Financial contributions 
addressing the physical needs of the poor fall within the remaining 29 percent 
of expenditures. 
 *** 
 [C]omparing their charitable giving to the performance of secular charities 
is informative. The American Red Cross spends 92.1 percent of its revenue 
directly addressing the physical needs of those it intends to help; only 7.9 
percent is spent on “operating expenses.” If you use a generous 50 percent 
cutoff for indicating whether an institution is primarily a charitable 
organization or not (that is, they spend more than 50 percent of revenue on 
charitable work addressing physical needs), we doubt there is a single religion 
in the world that would actually qualify as a charitable organization. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Apparently recognizing this, a number of churches voluntarily 
disclose audited financial information. See, e.g., Seven Standards of Responsible 
Stewardship, EVANGELICAL COUNCIL FOR FIN. ACCOUNTABILITY, http://www.ecfa.org/ 
Content/Standards (last visited Feb. 12, 2018) (listing standards for participating religious 
organizations, including financial oversight and transparency). 
 127. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE 
GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 114 (1913). 
 128. See, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at 207. 
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better data and making that data more publicly available.”129 Indeed, as the 
Commissioner explained, “[t]ransparency is the linchpin of compliance, 
[and] when the structure and operations of charitable organizations are 
visible to all, the possibility of misuse and abuse is reduced.”130 There is 
simply no real argument that this reasoning does not apply to churches 




If anything, there is excellent reason to think that this need for 
transparency is more urgent when applied to churches than in other non-
profit contexts.
132
 Churches exert a powerful psychological and cultural pull 
on their adherents. Congregants look to church leaders for guidance and 
leadership and will routinely accept statements from the pulpit as truthful or 
as reliable, even if those statements are not internally consistent or are at 
odds with other sources of information. This is not a critical or derogatory 
statement; church and religion are fundamentally about accepting or 
acknowledging a power greater than oneself, and that sort of acceptance 
leads to a particular vulnerability when it comes to informational 
asymmetry. A church is in a unique position to insulate itself from its 
donors (or investors, if you will) because it can broadly claim to be “doing 
good” or to be “spending wisely” with little internal pressure. Without the 
government or another third party to apply any pressure toward 
transparency or disclosure, this lack of oversight will ineluctably lead to a 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Hearing on Tax-Exempt Charitable Orgs. Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the 
H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 110th Cong. 11 (2007) (statement of Steven T. Miller, 
Commissioner, Tax Exempt and Government Entities Division, Internal Revenue Service). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See, e.g., Mishchenko, supra note 18, at 1363 (calling this nondisclosure “one of the 
biggest tax loopholes of all time”); see also Federal Tax Rules Applicable to Tax-Exempt 
Organizations Involving Television Ministries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight 
of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 100th Cong. 55 (1987) (“We are of the opinion that 
there is not a constitutional prohibition on requiring churches to file Form 990 information 
returns.”). In fact, Congress nearly imposed the 990 filing requirement on churches in 1969 
but it retreated in the face of religious lobbying, particularly from Brigham Young 
University, a subsidiary of the LDS Church, and the United States Catholic Conference. See 
Brunson, supra note 79, at 5-6. These entities argued that the cost of disclosure would be too 
large and that requiring such disclosure would harm the separation of church and state. 
Although these arguments carried the day, they are rather weak considering the current 
interplay between churches and the broader economy. See Montague, supra note 51, at 216 
(indicating that the exemption arose at a time when churches were not supposed to engage in 
“substantial commercial activity” (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 67 (1969))). 
 132. Montague, supra note 51, at 231-41 (discussing the influence and control religious 
leaders can exert with respect to church governance). 
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situation where churches tend to stray from the underlying goals of their 
donations (whether received directly from their donors or derivatively from 
taxpayers) to a greater degree than other charities that neither have 
psychological power over their donors nor are permitted to operate without 
any disclosure whatsoever. 
Many of the broader economic arguments set forth in this Article apply 
generally to all tax-exempt charities. But churches, given their lack of 
reporting requirements and their unique role in society, are different. They 
have a compounded ability to mislead or stray from the charitable purposes 
that justify their unique status.
133
 The reason why there are so many 
churches with significant profit-seeking activity is simple: because they 
can. They can because there is simply nothing preventing them from doing 
so. As such, it is especially important that churches should disclose their 
finances; it is especially the case that, for churches, “[t]ruth never damages 
a cause that is just.”134 
The second proposal is a subsequent, contingent one. Given the almost 
total opacity of how much money churches bring in and how they spend 
that money, a serious conversation and debate should occur following the 
imposition of the reporting requirement discussed above. Once there is an 
actual accounting, society can determine whether churches spend “enough” 
on charity. This would clearly be a value-laden conversation. As discussed 
above, there is some argument as to what should qualify as “charity.”135 
And there would also be substantial debate as to what qualifies as 
“enough.”  
Such an argument and conversation is a legitimate and important one to 
have. Perhaps churches donate more than it appears to charitable causes, 
and perhaps the public would be perfectly content with the manner in which 
these entities are utilizing their tax subsidies. If that is the case, then society 
benefits by having an honest conversation, informed by concrete figures 
and clear accounting, about how tax subsidies are spent.  
                                                                                                                 
 133. See supra note 49, acknowledging the potentially broad bases for churches’ special 
treatment but arguing that the policies inherent in this area of the law are rationally, and 
historically, grounded in charity that is directed outward from the church and designed to 
help the poor and aid society. 
 134. 2 M.K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENCE IN PEACE AND WAR 162 (1949), https://archive.org/ 
details/in.ernet.dli.2015.174816/page/n173. Some may argue that financial disclosure is 
more complex than this statement implies. See, e.g., Brunson, supra note 79, at 2 
(“Disclosure should be instrumental, not an end in itself.”). Building on Form 990 should 
substantially counter such arguments, as this form already represents the considered 
enforcement and compliance policies and goals of the IRS. 
 135. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 43, at 1381. 
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On the other hand, if churches donate less to the needy than is generally 
believed,
136
 then there is a powerful argument that churches should be taxed 
upon their capital inflows—from whatever source derived—to the extent 
that such capital is not redirected by the recipient to “charitable works.”137 
This is not a novel suggestion in the charitable realm, and it finds its 
basis in the law applicable to private foundations. 
[T]ax law requires through excise tax enforcement that a private 
foundation make distributions for charitable, educational, 
religious, and similar kinds of purposes. These distributions are 
called “qualifying distributions” . . . [and are effected by 
requiring] the distributions for each year . . . to equal the greater 
of the foundation’s adjusted net income for the tax year or a 




Congress mandated these kinds of distributions in the Tax Reform Act of 
1969.
139
 This mandate arose out of the concern that private foundations 
were accumulating funds for private, non-charitable purposes without 
consequence, and were thereby creating a professional class of highly 
compensated administrators who were, in actuality, the only group to 
significantly benefit from private foundations and their corresponding tax 
subsidies.
140
 As such, a fee or tax was required to provide for the “vigorous 
and extensive administration . . . needed in order to provide appropriate 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See sources cited supra note 45. 
 137. This idea holds regardless of the organizational structure of the church, of which 
there are many. See, e.g., ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 39, at 542–49. A contribution to any 
type of organization is deductible, so that deduction can be eliminated for any type of 
organization.  
 138. Charitable Giving ¶ 30.19 (Westlaw, Thomson Reuters, Tax & Accounting 2017) 
(citing I.R.C. §§ 4942(c), 4942(d), 4942(e) (2012)); see also I.R.C. §§ 4940, 4944 (imposing 
an excise tax on the net investment income of private foundations and on certain investments 
that may jeopardize a private foundation’s tax-exempt purpose). 
 139. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
 140. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRC 4942(G) – QUALIFYING DISTRIBUTIONS (1988), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicd88.pdf; Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107. A 
similar concern—with a similar governmental response—arises in connection with 
university and college endowments. See, e.g., Andrew Kreighbaum, Final GOP Deal Would 
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assurances that private foundations will promptly and properly use their 
funds for charitable purposes.”141 
The parallel here is clear: churches that distribute little or nothing to 
charity accumulate wealth without oversight. And wealth is not the only 
thing they accumulate. These entities grow a seemingly endless supply of 
hangers-on, professionals, and administrators who benefit from an 
extraordinary concentration of wealth that is never distributed or given 
away.
142
 Directing little to none of their tax-exempt donations to charity, 
these individuals become the only class genuinely benefiting from the tax 
subsidies afforded by the American taxpayer.
143
  
Presuming these individuals to be rational economic actors, they are 
simply doing what they are reasonably expected to do. They are directly 
incentivized to minimize charitable contributions in order to maximize 
accumulated wealth and preserve their direct financial stake in what 
becomes, in essence, a financially conservative and entirely tax-benefit-
                                                                                                                 
 141. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, at 19 (1969). This approach has been echoed by other 
commentators who have studied tax-exempt organizations, albeit in a different context and 
for different reasons. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 35, at 10–11 (recommending taxation of 
currently exempt entities that “conduct active commercial businesses” and 501(c)(3) public 
charities with substantial assets that are not used for charitable purposes). 
 142. See, e.g., Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 107 (discussing the “growing 
perception among lawmakers that private foundations, with their small networks of financers 
and administrators, were less accountable to the public than traditional charities” as the 
motivation behind requiring foundations to distribute some funds each year). Admittedly, the 
kinds of qualifying distributions required of private foundations generally include 
“reasonable and necessary administrative expenses,” Betsy Buchalter Adler & Brigit 
Kavanagh, Philanthropic Partnerships Using the “Out of Corpus” Rules, TAX’N EXEMPTS, 
May/June 2010, at 19, 20, a concept that could include some of the outsized spending 
churches currently devote to their own administrators. 
 143. And this is if one presumes that there is no fraud or outright financial chicanery 
involved. Even if the administrators of these churches are entirely forthright in their personal 
dealings (a supposition there is much reason to doubt—see, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at 
232 (“Another study found that in 2000, an estimated $7 billion was embezzled by leaders of 
churches and religious organizations in the United States.”))—and even if they are not 
compensated at outrageous rates (another supposition there is much reason to doubt—see, 
e.g., Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 983 n.4 (4th Cir. 1994) (listing some of the incredible 
compensation perks allotted to the Bakkers, including “a luxury parsonage, complete with an 
air-conditioned treehouse and personal waterslide”))—these people are still, by definition, 
the only ones who benefit from the money flowing to churches when that money stays 
within the confines of the churches. Indeed, there is reason to think that churches are 
particularly susceptible to the kind of abuse that disclosure and transparency would help 
prevent. See, e.g., Montague, supra note 51, at 231–46 (discussing social and cultural factors 
that can lead to fraud, abuse, and corruption in a church setting). 
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 Of course, as discussed above, this behavior does not 
have the society-fortifying effect sought by the government and instead 
undermines and distorts the broader economy. It essentially becomes an 
inevitable mutation greatly benefiting the individuals who are in a position 
to direct the investment strategies of churches. Recognizing this parallel, 
the government should turn to the remedy it has crafted with respect to 




The requirements applicable to foundations are quite technical and 
specific, and this Article is not suggesting a direct application of these 
principles to churches.
146
 Indeed, any such analysis would be premature 
prior to a thorough review of the information that would be provided by 
requiring churches to report their finances.
147
 
                                                                                                                 
 144. In fact, the predictability of this behavior is an implicit conclusion of this Article. 
Professional clergy are provided with a completely opaque and culturally favored investment 
vehicle that is tax-incentivized to hold and invest funds. Such a vehicle protects their social 
and economic position and permits an ever-expanding pursuit of additional opportunities and 
contributors. If a publicly traded corporation were permitted to keep all of its activities secret 
and allowed to raise and invest tax-free funds, what would it do? It would do exactly the 
same thing, never returning or distributing any donations because it would be economically 
foolish to do so. Churches—and the paid professionals who run them—are doing just that, 
simply responding to the incentives put to them by the IRC. Draining the situation of moral 
or ethical overtones, what can really be expected, and what blame can really be assigned? 
The constructive approach is to identify the situation as an institutionalized moral hazard and 
attempt to remedy it.  
 145. Note that much of the reasoning supporting the adoption of this second 
recommendation may apply to non-church charities as well. However, such an extension is 
outside the scope of this Article. It also seems—given the scope of the “non-charity 
spending problem” and the cultural issues inherent in a church setting—that churches may 
be more likely to need this nudging toward charitable behavior than, say, the Red Cross or a 
hospital. Again, though, the thesis of this Article obviates any need for such an analysis or 
discussion here. 
 146. See, e.g., John Dedon & Benjamin Kinder, Cautionary Guidance for Operating a 
Private Foundation, EST. PLAN., Feb. 2017, at 9, 11-13 (noting numerous complications of, 
and restrictions placed upon, private foundations, including an excise tax tied to net 
investment income, prohibited transactions with “disqualified persons,” qualifying 
distributions tied to a foundation’s investment assets, prohibitions on excessive or risky 
business holdings, imposition of “taxable expenditure” rules, and restrictions on donations to 
foreign organizations). 
 147. For example, most churches spend perhaps 10-20% of their tithed funds on 
“management and overhead.” Going forward, that figure could become a benchmark as to 
the spending levels permitted on that line item with exempt funds. In a sense, what this 
argument is suggesting is that society carefully re-evaluate the definition of charity, found in 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(iv), as including a description as broad as “advancement of 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/4
2019]       LET MY ARM BE BROKEN OFF AT THE ELBOW 493 
 
 
Instead, it is enough here to argue that the broad principle of enforced 
distributions should apply. Generally speaking, churches should be required 
to pay tax on all funds that are not redirected to “charitable purposes,” 
however such phrase is ultimately defined. Doing so will place churches on 
the same footing with other market-facing entities by effectively 
eliminating the tax shelter churches now enjoy when they eschew charity in 
favor of profit-seeking.  
Let us return to our example above one last time. Recall that X Corp. and 
Church A are both examining whether to invest in a residential development 
and that, assuming they both have a 10% benchmark for return on 
investment, only Church A will be able to pay the $5,000,000 asking price 
(thus pressuring rates of return available across the spectrum to all entities). 
If, however, the money raised by Church X is taxed, then it will have to 
generate $6,250,000 in order to have $5,000,000 in expendable funds.
148
 Its 
10% benchmark now requires it to pursue a different opportunity—one that 
will return $625,000, placing it in the same position as X Corp.
149
 This 
                                                                                                                 
religion.” See supra note 49 and accompanying text. If “advancement of religion” is being 
used as cover to justify spending 2-3% on the needy, society should know that and decide 
whether that is consistent with the underlying rationale of the tax subsidy. That kind of re-
evaluation is an intensely fact-intensive analysis that involves a lot of value and policy 
judgments—the primary point is that, right now, our society is reaching its conclusions with 
no facts. 
 148. We are assuming equivalent tax rates. Setting tax rates is a complicated political 
process and is well outside the scope of the simplified issues and examples discussed herein. 
Assuming equivalent rates is helpful here because it demonstrates how a simple tweak to the 
tax code can place churches and for-profit entities on the same footing. 
 149. Note that this proposal does not require churches to pay taxes on the money 
generated by their active pursuit of profits. In theory, this is already required under the 
current law. See, e.g., Arnsberger et al., supra note 30, at 118 (“Exempt-organization 
business income taxation was designed to place unrelated activities of exempt organizations 
on an equal footing with similar activities carried out by taxable entities.”); see also 
Brunson, supra note 120, at 230–32 (describing the implementation of the UBIT as an 
attempt to prevent for-profit businesses owned by tax-exempt entities from escaping taxation 
and so preventing an unfair advantage); Sharpe, supra note 30, at 382–98 (discussing the 
history behind the adoption of the UBIT and the rationale thereof, grounded in the idea that 
exempt entities should not be able to engage in unrelated activities and so “gain competitive 
advantage over private enterprise” (quoting 96 CONG. REC. 769, 771 (1950) (message from 
the President to the United States))). The concept behind the UBIT—focused as it is on 
active profit-seeking and the unfair competition arising therefrom—is very similar to that 
discussed in this Article; commentators have traditionally cast the unfair advantage that 
UBIT is meant to avoid as having two parts: (1) because tax-exempt entities do not pay tax, 
they can charge lower prices and still earn the same return as their competitors, and (2) 
because tax-exempt entities can accumulate earnings more quickly, they can grow faster and 
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means that churches will no longer have first access to the “best” 




This is, of course, a very broad recommendation. Tax strategy is a highly 
complex and technical pursuit, and this Article does not intend to address 
all aspects of how such a system would work.
151
 It is enough that, pursuant 
                                                                                                                 
have a lower risk of bankruptcy or insolvency. See Brunson, supra note 120, at 232; see also 
Hansmann, supra note 106, at 611 (“The more compelling view . . . is that corporate income 
tax does affect the cost of capital at the margin and that, everything else being equal, tax-
exempt corporations have higher rates of return on investment than those of taxable firms. 
Thus, tax-exempt firms can earn a profit at prices below those at which taxable firms can 
break even.”). This Article is based on precisely the same concern, but at an earlier stage of 
the profit-seeking process. That is, it is concerned with the “front-end” of the church-charity 
industry, the manner in which these entities first raise the money they utilize. The UBIT is 
directed to the “back-end” of the industry—the manner in which those funds are then used 
(which use potentially benefits from tax exemption). This Article focuses on the distortions 
arising from how an organization’s donated capital is taxed, not on how it is spent or 
invested. 
 150. This is because church funds spent on charity will remain untaxed. Note, too, that 
this does not require a change to the law permitting taxpayers to deduct charitable 
contributions. See I.R.C. § 170 (2012). This can stand as-is so long as churches are taxed on 
funds not spent on charity. Another way of viewing the problem is that it essentially arises 
from the divorce of churches from their source of capital (their donors). Corporations have 
no such divorce from their source of capital and so, being a mere conduit for the economic 
goals of others, have to capture the tax status of their shareholders. Imposing a tax on 
churches evens the score by imposing the same tax ramifications on churches as on everyone 
else because it requires churches to view the world through the eyes of their tax-paying 
donors in the same manner as corporations have to view the world through the eyes of their 
tax-paying shareholders.  
 151. In particular, it seems likely that what qualifies as “charity” would be a tricky and 
intrinsically subjective determination. Charities, like all organizations, have some overhead. 
Would rent for headquarters qualify? Salaries? Bonuses? What about money expended on 
world-class healthcare for high-level functionaries? Or would it be easier for the law to 
simply set a presumably acceptable overhead rate, such as 20% of all funds raised? 
Similarly, how quickly would a church have to expend funds in order to avoid taxation? 
Could they wait a year? Two years? What if there are no suitable charitable objects 
available—should there be an exception granted in certain circumstances? These are 
interesting questions that would have significant effects on individual entities. See, e.g., 
Miller, supra note 35, at 500–01 (briefly examining some specific suggestions and indicating 
that Congress “could appropriately provide that any public charity whose assets are not 
directly used for charitable purposes exceed a threshold amount and consistently exceed a 
stated multiple of its average annual expenditures would be taxable to the extent of its non-
UBTI investment income (or possibly the sum of its net non-UBTI investment income plus 
new contributions) that is (are) not used directly for charitable purposes”); Sharpe, supra 
note 30, at 412–43 (discussing the definition of “trade or business” and “substantially 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/4
2019]       LET MY ARM BE BROKEN OFF AT THE ELBOW 495 
 
 
to the first recommendation above, churches will have to disclose where 
their funds go and that those funds that do not go to charity will be treated 




The problems identified in this Article are significant. The LDS Church 
is a poignant example. This is unsurprising because it is a cogent 
representation of the problems that can result from an unmonitored and 
unchecked system of charitable taxation. But this is not only an issue for the 
LDS Church, nor is it really an issue of greed or even blame. All churches 
are permitted to operate secretly, and all churches receive tax-free 
contributions and are given other substantial tax exemptions. This 
combination of secrecy and special tax treatment pushes tax-exempt entities 
away from the very charitable acts they are supposed to perform and into 
profit-seeking endeavors. It is simply a situation of churches (and their 
minders) reacting rationally to the incentives placed before them. Because 
churches can raise money and funds at a lower price than others, they have 
an incentive to do so as much as possible and put those funds to use in a 
manner that makes economic sense for them.  
In such an economic and tax regime, one may end up reasonably 
confusing spirituality and capital pursuits. But a lack of culpability does not 
make it right. What we end up with is a system that does not result in the 
kind of charity it purports to stimulate but instead distorts the broader 
economy and harms investors throughout the American marketplace. This 
situation should not be acceptable to the U.S. taxpayer.  
The government should foreclose this kind of behavior by requiring 
churches to disclose their finances and levy a tax on money that does not go 
to charity. In the end, the taxpayer has made a very conscious investment in 
a clearly defined set of goods and services, and charities should have to 
deliver on that investment. 
                                                                                                                 
related” in the context of the UBIT at length, concepts that could be usefully applied to 
separate “non-profit” from “profit”). Ultimately, in the context of this Article, these are mere 
details. But see ZELINSKY, supra note 51, at 113-56 (arguing that taxation of churches risks 
undue entanglement and pointing out that these sorts of subjective decisions inherently affect 
religion in a negative way). Simply accepting that funds that are not spent on charity should 
be taxed will have the desired impact, regardless of what technical aspects end up being 
implemented. 
 152. “Distortions are bad because they change what an actor would do in a tax-free 
world; in the interest of efficiency, the tax law tries to minimize the effect that taxes have on 
taxpayers’ decisions.” Brunson, supra note 120, at 250. 
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